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Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing 
Legal Complexity 
J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz 
ABSTRACT: The American legal system is often accused of being “too 
complex.” For example, most Americans believe the Tax Code is too complex. 
But what does that mean, and how would one prove the Tax Code is too 
complex? Both the descriptive claim that an element of law is complex and the 
normative claim that it is too complex should be empirically testable 
hypotheses. Yet, in fact, very little is known about how to measure legal 
complexity, much less how to monitor and manage it. 
Legal scholars have begun to employ the science of complex adaptive systems, 
also known as complexity science, to probe these kinds of descriptive and 
normative questions about the legal system. This body of work has focused 
primarily on developing theories of legal complexity and positing reasons for, 
and ways of, managing it. Legal scholars thus have skipped the hard part—
developing quantitative metrics and methods for measuring and monitoring 
law’s complexity. But the theory of legal complexity will remain stuck in theory 
until it moves to the empirical phase of study. Thinking about ways of 
managing legal complexity is pointless if there is no yardstick for deciding 
how complex the law should be. In short, the theory of legal complexity cannot 
be put to work without more robust empirical tools for identifying and 
tracking complexity in legal systems. 
This Article explores legal complexity at a depth not previously undertaken in 
legal scholarship. First, the Article orients the discussion by briefly reviewing 
complexity science scholarship to develop descriptive, prescriptive, and ethical 
theories of legal complexity. The Article then shifts to the empirical front, 
identifying potentially useful metrics and methods for studying legal 
complexity. It draws from complexity science to develop methods that have 
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been or might be applied to measure different features of legal complexity. 
Next, the Article proposes methods for monitoring legal complexity over time, 
in particular by conceptualizing what we call Legal Maps—a multi-layered, 
active representation of the legal system network at work. Finally, the Article 
concludes with a preliminary examination of how the measurement and 
monitoring techniques could inform interventions designed to manage legal 
complexity by using currently available machine learning and user interface 
design technologies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do you believe the U.S. Tax Code is too complex? If so, you are in good 
company—most Americans believe the Tax Code is too complex.1 Many legal 
scholars believe the Tax Code is too complex.2 Even the Internal Revenue 
Service’s own National Taxpayer Advocate Service believes the Tax Code is 
too complex.3 And this is not a new sentiment in society—“[s]ince the 
inception of the federal income tax, commentators have viewed complexity 
as virtually inevitable.”4 But prove it! That’s right, prove the Tax Code is too 
complex. 
How would you do that? How would you prove the Tax Code—or any 
other statute or regulation—is too complex? Making such a claim about some 
element of law requires proof of two related hypotheses. The first is 
descriptive: the law is complex. The second is normative: the law is too complex. 
Both are, in theory, empirically testable hypotheses. The claim that a body of 
law is complex requires some convention for defining legal complexity and 
 
 1. Surveys routinely find the vast majority of American taxpayers believe the Code is too 
complex. See, e.g., Courtney Coren, Tax Poll: Most Americans Say Tax Code Is Too Complicated, 
NEWSMAX (Apr. 11, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/quinnipiac-poll-irs-
tax/2013/04/11/id/498974. Google searches for “U.S. tax code too complex” and “tax code is 
too complex” yield millions of sites. 
 2. For a small slice, see Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the 
Internal Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the Deductibility of Capital Losses, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083 
(1999); Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the 
Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405 (2005); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case 
Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645 (2003); James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the 
Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REV. 7 (1989); Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and Passive Activity 
Limitations: Can Complexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV. 97 (1989); Susan B. Long & Judyth A. 
Swingen, An Approach to the Measurement of Tax Law Complexity, 8 J. AM. TAX ASS’N 22 (1987); 
Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267; John A. Miller, 
Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. 
L. REV. 1 (1993); and Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can 
Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151 (1997). 
 3. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 
2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2012), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-
Report/downloads/Most-Serious-Problems-Tax-Code-Complexity.pdf (“The most serious problem 
facing taxpayers—and the IRS—is the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code (the ‘tax code’).”). 
 4. Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of 
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 408 (1997) (citing 
commentary from the early 1900s). 
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then some way of measuring whatever that is. Further, the claim that a body 
of law is too complex requires identifying an optimal legal complexity and 
some way of comparing a particular law’s complexity to that standard. With 
all the arm-waving about the excessive complexity of the Tax Code, one would 
think these two sets of metrics are well established and routinely applied 
across a wide berth of the legal domain. That would be a mistake. Law’s 
complexity, while often invoked in rhetorical policy debates, is in fact one of 
the least understood and measured features of law. Thus, making the legal 
system less complex, or “simpler,” remains a popular but elusive remedy for 
“too much complexity,” with prescriptions often appearing more complex 
than the problem.5 
As intuitive as it is to any lawyer that the law is complex, getting a handle 
on exactly what that means and what to do about it is no simple matter. First, 
one needs a theoretical foundation to describe complexity in terms relevant 
to legal systems. What is legal complexity, and what attributes and variables 
go into making legal systems complex? Then one must develop metrics and 
methods to measure and monitor those attributes in the legal system. Armed 
with such data, legal theorists, politicians, and citizens can begin an evidence-
based debate regarding how complex the law should be. And, if it were 
determined that the law is too complex or not complex enough, it would be 
useful to have the means to adjust and manage the law’s complexity. Of 
course, none of these is a small task. 
Legal scholars have begun to employ complexity science (also known as 
complexity theory) as one lens through which to probe these descriptive and 
normative questions about law’s complexity.6 The focus of complexity science 
 
 5. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013) (arguing that 
the regulatory state can be made more simple through cost-benefit analysis, regulatory “nudges” 
of behavior, information disclosure, eliminating red tape, and other measures). 
 6. For an overview of complexity science and how scholars in the social sciences, including 
law, have integrated it, see generally J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. L. REV. 885 
(2008). Further details on complexity in the legal system are provided infra Parts II–III. We need 
to stress at the outset that the use of complexity science in legal systems theory is distinct from 
other systems models that have been used in legal applications. In particular, the famous German 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann developed an “autopoiesis” systems model that has had tremendous 
influence in European legal theory. See generally Jakob Arnoldi, Niklas Luhmann: An Introduction, 
18 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Feb. 2001 (introducing a special issue devoted to Luhmann); 
Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 136 (1989) (outlining the model). 
There is some disagreement over the distinctions between the complexity science and autopoiesis 
models, however, as the two bear similarities and distinctions. Most legal scholars who have 
explored the two models consider them related but distinct forms of systems theory. See Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 483–84 nn.13–17 (1997); Thomas 
E. Webb, Exploring System Boundaries, 24 L. CRITIQUE 131, 131–32 (2013) [hereinafter Webb, 
Exploring System Boundaries]. Others describe autopoiesis as “a significant branch of complexity 
theory.” See, e.g., Julian Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity: Complexity Theory & the Normative 
Reconstruction of Law, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 227, 227 n.3 (2005) [hereinafter Webb, Law, Ethics, 
and Complexity]. Going further, some legal scholars have employed systems models purportedly 
or impliedly different from both the autopoiesis and complexity science models, see, e.g., LoPucki, 
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is complex adaptive systems, systems “in which large networks of components 
with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex 
collective behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via 
learning or evolution.”7 Thus far, legal scholars using this discipline to study 
law’s complexity focus primarily on describing legal systems as complex 
adaptive systems to understand the origins of legal complexity and on 
exploring theoretical ways of managing it. In other words, legal scholars have 
largely skipped the hard part—developing quantitative metrics and methods 
for measuring and monitoring law’s complexity.8 But the theory of legal 
complexity will remain stuck in theory until it moves to the empirical phase 
of study; thinking about how to manage legal complexity is pointless if there 
is no yardstick for deciding how complex the law should be. In short, we 
cannot put the theory of legal complexity to work without robust empirical 
tools. 
To put this problem in practical terms, consider again the Tax Code. 
Exactly how complex is the Tax Code, and how complex should it be 
compared to, say, securities laws or environmental protection laws? American 
individuals and businesses in 2012 spent 6.1 billion hours and $168 billion 
complying with the Tax Code’s nearly 4 million words of text, a text which 
Congress has changed over 5000 times between 2001 and 2012.9 Are those 
figures proof of the Tax Code’s excess complexity? Tax Code “simplification” 
is often associated with reducing these compliance costs.10 But is the best 
measure of Tax Code complexity the hours and dollars spent complying with 
it? After all, knowing how much time and money is spent on tax compliance 
might tell us more about “tax morality” than about the Tax Code’s 
 
supra, at 488–509 (sketching out what is described as a distinct, empirically oriented “systems 
approach” for legal design), while others have cherry-picked concepts from complexity science 
to construct a legal systems model without explicitly calling it a complexity science model. See, 
e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011) (developing a “systems theory” 
model of constitutional dynamics using many concepts from complexity science); Thomas E. 
Webb, Book Note, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1182, 1182–83 (2012) [hereinafter Webb, Book Note] 
(reviewing VERMEULE, supra) (showing that the concepts Vermeule uses, “taken collectively, 
indicate that the theory under discussion is complexity theory, although this is not clearly 
stated”). We are not making any claims in this Article about these or any other legal systems 
models and do not cover them in any further detail. Our interest is in how the concept of 
complexity as developed specifically in complexity science can be applied and tested in legal 
systems. 
 7. MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009). The term “complex 
adaptive system” is often used to distinguish between complex systems that that are highly 
adaptive (such as an ecosystem) versus nonadaptive (such as a hurricane). 
 8. Significant exceptions are discussed in more detail in Part III infra. 
 9. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 10. See Joel Slemrod & Nikki Sorum, The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax 
System 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1401, 1984), http://www.nber. 
org/papers/w1401.pdf (noting that at the time of the study in 1984 there was “an almost 
complete absence of quantitative information about the magnitude and characteristics of the cost 
of the current system”). 
A5_RUHL&KATZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2015  8:54 AM 
196 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:191 
complexity. People and businesses in Greece reportedly devote little time and 
money to tax compliance,11 but that does not prove that their tax laws are less 
complex than our Tax Code. 
A less obvious measure of Tax Code complexity could be the complexity 
of popular tax compliance software programs such as TurboTax. Tax software 
companies are essentially selling the simplification of the Tax Code for the 
user, yet they must provide a product that accurately calculates the user’s tax 
liability under any scenario and thus must somehow pack all of the Tax Code’s 
substance into the software program. The program itself, however, has its own 
internal coding complexity, which software developers measure through 
various technical metrics and which software companies seek to control for 
business-cost purposes.12 If the software is too complex, for example, it may 
be very difficult to update the program as Congress changes the Tax Code, as 
a change in one provision cascades in effect to other provisions.13 It would be 
in a tax software company’s interests, therefore, to develop a program that is 
no more complex than needed to produce accurate user tax liability 
calculations. Perhaps a good measure of Tax Code complexity would then be 
the complexity of reliable tax compliance software. 
These are just two of the many possible ways of measuring Tax Code 
complexity; others that have been proposed focus on attributes such as the 
text’s “readability”14 or the number of tax rates and special provisions.15 The 
point is that people speak freely and passionately about the Tax Code’s 
complexity, yet there is no standard set of metrics for measuring Tax Code 
complexity, no agreement on precisely how complex the Tax Code should be 
(other than less complex than it is now), and little agreement on how to 
achieve such a target if there were one. If everyone agreed that the Tax Code 
should be no more complex than to require 2.7 billion hours and $45 billion 
in compliance efforts; no more complex than to require half the software 
complexity needed to code today’s tax compliance software; or no more 
complex than to require a fifth-grade reading level, how would Congress 
know what to do to the Tax Code? Which provisions should Congress tweak 
to weed out the complexity? And what possible costs could reducing 
complexity have on the Tax Code’s effectiveness in meeting tax policy goals? 
 
 11. Tax Evasion in Greece: In Flagrante, ECONOMIST (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://www. 
economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/09/tax-evasion-greece. 
 12. For an article that is considered one of the classic early reviews of software complexity 
measurement, see Joseph K. Kearney et al., Software Complexity Measurement, 29 COMM. ACM 1044 
(1986). 
 13. See Rajiv D. Banker et al., Software Complexity and Maintenance Costs, 36 COMM. ACM 81 
(1993) (confirming that software maintenance is significantly affected by software complexity). 
 14. See, e.g., Andrew Stumpff Morrison, Case Law, Systematic Law, and a Very Modest Suggestion, 
35 STATUTE L. REV. 149, 163 (2014). 
 15. See George Warskett et al., The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems, 5 
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 123, 123 (1998) (“The complexity of a tax system is usually associated with 
the numbers of tax rates, tax bases and special provisions it includes.”). 
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One reason it is difficult to approach these questions is that the metrics 
currently proposed for measuring Tax Code complexity turn the problem on 
its head. The Tax Code is not complex because of its costs of compliance, 
difficult readability, number of rates and special provisions, or the complexity 
of tax compliance software. Rather, the Tax Code imposes costly compliance 
burdens, is difficult to read, has lots of rates and special provisions, and poses 
a challenge to software developers because it is complex. These attributes are 
consequences of Tax Code complexity, not its causes. They do not get at the 
heart of why the Tax Code is complex and what makes it, allegedly, too much 
so. And while these attributes undoubtedly are useful metrics for evaluating 
whether the Tax Code is complex, they are of little help in determining how 
to solve the Tax Code’s complexity problem (if it has one). Taking the 
temperature of an ill patient may show how ill the patient is but not why the 
patient is ill or what to do about it. 
The Tax Code in this respect is a microcosm of legal complexity in 
general and an example of how little we understand its causes, consequences, 
and cures. The same questions could be asked of environmental law, 
securities law, health law, and dozens of other legal fields; answers would be 
wanting in those fields, too.16 In short, there is very little empirically robust 
understanding of the causes of legal complexity,17 which reduces the 
normative debate over legal complexity and how to “simplify” law largely to 
scholarly theory and political rhetoric.18 
One might argue that, even accepting the foregoing, the complexity of 
law is extraneous to the challenge of designing legal measures to achieve 
policy goals.19 So long as a law or doctrine is performing effectively in meeting 
its intended purposes, the argument would go, it must be “just right” in terms 
of complexity.20 But this argument would rely on the assumption that for each 
 
 16. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works Better Than Weak Regulation: 
The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204, 1205–06 (2013). 
Environmental law is an example of “mature regulatory environments where the underlying 
statutes remain static and complexity increases over time.” Id. 
 17. See Daniel Martin Katz & M.J. Bommarito II, Measuring the Complexity of the Law: The 
United States Code, 22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 337, 338–41 (2014) (reviewing legal 
scholarship on measurement of legal complexity). 
 18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (proposing 
measures to simplify legal systems without defining empirical metrics for measuring legal 
complexity); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5 (outlining reforms claimed to simplify and thus improve 
governance). 
 19. Generally, “[a]n effective regulatory design is one that achieves the identified regulatory 
goals.” Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework 
for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. LEGIS. 19, 27 (2014). 
 20. According to law and economics theory: 
Once lawmakers list all the relevant costs and benefits of complexity, optimizing the 
amount of complexity in the law becomes a straightforward exercise in economic 
marginalism. One continues to add incremental precision to a rule as long as the 
sum of the benefits of the new twist exceed the sum of its costs. 
A5_RUHL&KATZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2015  8:54 AM 
198 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:191 
policy goal there is a fixed amount of legal complexity required to fulfill it—
any more or less would throw the law or doctrine off its optimal performance 
in achieving its goals. Yet there is no a priori reason to believe this is true. 
There could be multiple alternative legal designs, each with different levels of 
legal complexity (however measured) but all equally effective at fulfilling a 
prescribed policy goal. 
Still, when choosing between such alternative legal constructions, one 
could argue that complexity should only matter in the design phase if there 
is reason to believe complexity matters in the performance phase as a factor 
influencing not only efficiency and effectiveness, but also equity, legitimacy, 
transparency, and other important normative features of legal systems.21 But 
if the Tax Code debate is any indication, many observers firmly believe that 
legal complexity has important practical policy implications. The Tax Code 
complexity debate also suggests that legal complexity is not a novel or 
controversial claim—it is a mainstream concern about the legal system. Legal 
complexity matters. 
What is more likely to strike readers as “out there” is our claim that 
complexity science, with its origins in physics and ecology, provides a useful 
framework for studying legal complexity. Most lawyers are likely unfamiliar 
with complexity science, and some legal scholars have even expressed 
skepticism that it has much to offer the study of law.22 Legal scholarship, 
however, is seldom at the forefront of innovation in the social sciences. 
Complexity science has had tremendous influence already in other social 
science disciplines, including most prominently economics,23 political 
 
Kades, supra note 4, at 419 (offering an alternative using computational theory). 
 21. See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 27–31 (identifying these other factors as 
important normative considerations in regulatory design). 
 22. See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 8 (claiming that some applications of systems theory in 
law “reek of pseudoscience, as practitioners offer mysterious utterances about ‘complexity’ and 
‘chaos’” and that “there is a core of genuine insight to systems theory that is not at all obscurantist 
or bogus”); LoPucki, supra note 6, at 483–84 (claiming that complexity science is unlikely to help 
advance understanding of legal systems beyond “levels of broad generality”); John Martinez, The 
Dynamic Cycle of Legal Change, 9 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y (SPECIAL EDITION) 10, 13–14 (2013) (claiming 
that “scholars have applied variants of complex adaptive systems theory—such as game theory 
and chaos theory—to the study of the legal system, but such efforts have foundered on the shoals 
of indeterminacy that such variants produce”). 
 23. See, e.g., ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND 
THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS (2006); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 
(1996); Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 
ECON. J. 116 (1989); Neil Johnson & Thomas Lux, Financial Systems: Ecology and Economics, 469 
NATURE 302 (2011); Robert M. May et al., Complex Systems: Ecology for Bankers, 451 NATURE 893 
(2008); Didier Sornette & Ryan Woodard, Financial Bubbles, Real Estate Bubbles, Derivative Bubbles, 
and the Financial and Economic Crisis, in ECONOPHYSICS APPROACHES TO LARGE-SCALE BUSINESS 
DATA AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 101 (Misako Takayasu et al. eds., 2010). 
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science,24 sociology,25 and international affairs,26 and it has been applied in 
the study of a wide variety of policy challenges such as terrorist networks,27 
healthcare,28 organized crime,29 transportation systems,30 urban growth,31 and 
national security.32 This does not mean complexity science will necessarily 
have the same utility when applied to legal systems, but if one believes legal 
complexity is a concern, it is probably worth exploring whether anything can 
be gained from applying a scientific discipline singularly devoted to the study 
of complexity in social and physical systems. 
Building on that theme, this Article explores the theoretical and 
empirical dimensions of legal complexity at a depth not previously 
undertaken in legal scholarship, but in terms we hope are accessible and of 
practical value to lawyers and legal scholars not already familiar with 
complexity science. Part II orients the discussion by briefly reviewing the core 
concepts of complexity science and legal scholars’ application of these 
theories to the law. There have been three major themes in this body of 
 
 24. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS 
OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION (1997); SCOTT DE MARCHI, COMPUTATIONAL AND 
MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005); ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: 
COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE (1997); HERBERT SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE 
ARTIFICIAL (1969); Michael J. Ensley et al., District Complexity as an Advantage in Congressional 
Elections, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 990 (2009); Ken Kollman et al., Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes, 
28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 139 (1998); Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE: SOCIETIES AS COMPLEX SYSTEMS (2005); 
Elizabeth E. Bruch & Robert D. Mare, Neighborhood Choice and Neighborhood Change, 112 AM. J. SOC. 
667 (2006); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 
137 (2000). 
 26. See, e.g., WALTER C. CLEMENS, COMPLEXITY SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS (2013); Robert 
Axelrod, The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization, 41 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 203 (1997); Lars-Erik Cederman, Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to 
Sandpiles, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135 (2003). 
 27. See, e.g., E. Ahmed et al., On Complex Adaptive Systems and Terrorism, 337 PHYSICS LETTERS 
A 127 (2005); Antoine Bousquet, Complexity Theory and the War on Terror: Understanding the Self-
Organising Dynamics of Leaderless Jihad, 15 J. INT’L REL. & DEV. 345 (2012); Vito Latora & Massimo 
Marchiori, How the Science of Complex Networks Can Help Developing Strategies Against Terrorism, 20 
CHAOS, SOLITONS & FRACTALS 69 (2004). 
 28. See, e.g., YANEER BAR-YAM ET AL., NEW ENG. COMPLEX SYS. INST., A COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
SCIENCE APPROACH TO HEALTHCARE COSTS AND QUALITY (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., Paul A.C. Duijn et al., The Relative Ineffectiveness of Criminal Network Disruption, 4 
SCI. REP. 4238 (2014). 
 30. See, e.g., A. Aw & M. Rascle, Resurrection of ‘Second Order’ Models of Traffic Flow, 60 SIAM J. 
APPLIED MATHEMATICS 916 (2000); Debashish Chowdhury, Statistical Physics of Vehicular Traffic 
and Some Related Systems, 329 PHYSICS REP. 199 (2000); Petter Holme, Congestion and Centrality in 
Traffic Flow on Complex Networks, 6 ADVANCES COMPLEX SYSTEMS 163 (2003); Bosiljka Tadić et al., 
Traffic on Complex Networks: Towards Understanding Global Statistical Properties from Microscopic Density 
Fluctuations, 69 PHYSICAL REV. E 036102 (2004); Bosiljka Tadić et al., Transport on Complex 
Networks: Flow, Jamming and Optimization, 17 INT’L J. BIFURCATION & CHAOS 2363 (2007). 
 31. See, e.g., Robert H. Samet et al., Complexity, the Science of Cities and Long-Range Futures, 47 
FUTURES 49 (2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Jürgen Scheffran, The Complexity of Security, 14 COMPLEXITY 13 (2008). 
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scholarship. First, a descriptive body of work has focused on mapping 
complexity science concepts onto legal systems to enable explanation of legal 
systems as complex adaptive systems. Second, a prescriptive thrust has moved 
from mapping concepts towards developing principles for structural design 
and normatively acceptable operation of legal systems given their complex 
adaptive system properties. Finally, an ethical focus in the literature explores 
what it means to be an actor in a complex legal system. 
Parts III–V then shift to the empirical front, identifying potentially useful 
metrics and methods for studying legal complexity. Part III draws from 
complexity science to develop methods that have or might be applied to 
measure aspects of legal complexity, including metrics for agents, trees, 
networks, computation, feedback, and emergence. Part IV proposes methods 
for monitoring legal complexity over time by conceptualizing what we call 
Legal Maps—a multi-layered, Google Maps-style active representation of the 
legal system network at work. Part V concludes with a preliminary 
examination of how these measurement and monitoring techniques could 
inform interventions by applying currently available machine learning and 
user interface design technologies. While there is no possibility of attaining 
full (or even near full) management control of a complex social system such 
as law, techniques used in other complex adaptive system environments—
such as financial- and transportation-systems management and software 
development—could prove adaptable to and useful in the long-term design, 
evaluation, and operation of legal systems. 
To be clear, we are not claiming that we can finely measure and tune 
legal complexity using current data management and computational 
capacities. Rather, this Article establishes an agenda for identifying the 
empirical questions and methodological approaches ripe for study. From 
there, we plan in future work to test our proposed approaches through 
applied empirical studies. We recognize that existing technology will support 
only relatively crude metrics and computational methods for exploring legal 
complexity, and we suffer from no delusion that we can fully describe and 
regulate legal complexity today, if ever. We and other researchers must study 
legal complexity in small increments to begin with, hoping over time to build 
improved theoretical foundations that will lead to refined and expanded 
research agendas designed to advance our practical understanding of legal 
complexity. This Article is our opening contribution to that research agenda. 
Law would not be the first domain to ask these questions about itself—it 
is a latecomer to complexity science, network analysis, machine learning, and 
other highly computational approaches to system assessment and 
management. Indeed, as important as the legal system is to social 
sustainability, it is a mystery to us why so much data and computational 
capacity is devoted in the business and finance sectors to monitoring financial 
system structure (not always successfully!) while legal scholars seldom use 
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these computational techniques to understand and evaluate the legal system 
as a system. This is what we hope to change. 
II. THE COMPLEXITY SCIENCE THEORY OF LEGAL COMPLEXITY 
The key premise in applying complexity science to legal systems is that 
there is a difference between complexity in the sense of “complicatedness” 
and complexity in the sense of system structure and behavior. That 
distinction, which goes to the essence of complexity science theory, is aptly 
described as follows: 
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up the 
system maintain a degree of independence from one another. Thus, 
removing one such element (which reduces the level of 
complication) does not fundamentally alter the system’s behavior 
apart from that which directly resulted from the piece that was 
removed. Complexity arises when the dependencies among the 
elements become important. In such a system, removing one such 
element destroys system behavior to an extent that goes well beyond 
what is embodied by the particular element that is removed.33 
Few dispute that law is complicated; whether it is complex in the systems 
context is another matter. 
To be sure, the complicatedness of law should not be discounted. Law 
can be vast, dense, vague, and intricate, making compliance a daunting 
undertaking. Complexity as used in our project, however, is getting at 
something different. Even in a world where all individual rules are perfectly 
clear and cost-efficient, knowing how to comply could still be burdensome. 
An effort burden would be associated with learning all the rules, and an 
information burden would be associated with compiling the evidence needed to 
test for and comply with the rules.34 But beyond that, the system of rules could 
be difficult to navigate and predict because of the interactions between the 
multitude of rules and institutions administering them.35 Complying with one 
rule could require actions that make complying with another rule more 
difficult.36 Similarly, because legal rules often are interrelated through 
techniques such as cross-referencing and stare decisis, how one rule is 
interpreted and applied could affect the meaning or operation of other 
 
 33. JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9 (2007). Thus, “work is needed on distinguishing the 
complex . . . from the just complicated in the presence of many possible explanatory models and 
imperfect data.” Nicholas W. Watkins & Mervyn P. Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 SCI. 323, 324 
(2008). 
 34. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion 
in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 798–800 (2003) (developing the concepts of effort 
and information burdens). 
 35. See id. at 800–23 (developing the concept of system burdens). 
 36. See id. (providing examples). 
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rules.37 These kinds of system burdens are usually overlooked in legal 
scholarship that addresses ways of measuring and managing legal 
complicatedness—even when referred to as “complexity”—where the focus is 
primarily or exclusively on effort and information burdens.38 
Complexity science emphasizes these systems effects, studying inter-
agent connections and the system-wide effects they produce. In the context 
of social systems, complexity science offers a different approach from that 
taken in small-number agent models (such as in bilateral game theory) and 
large-number agent models (such as the rational actor in law and economics). 
The problem with these inter-agent modeling approaches is that “most 
economic, political, and social interactions involve moderate numbers of 
people.”39 To elaborate: 
 Most social science models require either very few (typically two) 
or very many (often an infinity) agents to be tractable. When an 
agent interacts with only a few other agents, we can usually trace all 
of the potential actions and reactions. When an agent faces an 
infinity of other agents, we can average out . . . the behavior of the 
masses and again find ourselves back in a world that can be easily 
traced. It is in between these two extremes—when an agent interacts 
with a moderate number of others—that our traditional analytic 
tools break down.40 
In other words, traditional models of inter-agent behavior do not work well 
when there are too many interacting agents to fit neatly into bilateral models, 
but not enough agents to ignore idiosyncratic behavior by averaging-out to an 
infinite-numbers “rational actor” model. Throughout the legal system, agents 
in legal institutions and instruments interact in ways suggesting that the 
differences between agents matter. Thus, mean-field approximations do not 
always capture useful or relevant dynamics. The number of judges, lawyers, 
agencies, laws, or regulations is neither small nor infinite, and we can find no 
legal scholarship claiming that the differences between, say, judges or 
regulations, do not matter. 
 
 37. See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559, 587–88 (2014) 
(examining cascade effects in legal rule systems). 
 38. See Kades, supra note 4, at 416–21 (examining several different proposed metrics of 
legal complexity); see also Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 150, 150–51 (1995) (defining legal complexity as “the number and difficulty of 
distinctions the rules make” and arguing that “[a]ctors seeking to comply with more complex 
rules may need to expend resources to learn how the rules apply to their contemplated acts”); 
Morrison, supra note 14 (proposing a linguistic “readability” metric, acknowledging that it will 
register more complexity the more “systematic” the regime of legal rules); Peter H. Schuck, Legal 
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (“[A] legal system [i]s 
complex to the extent that its rules, processes, institutions, and supporting culture possess four 
features: density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty.”). 
 39. MILLER & PAGE, supra note 33, at 221. 
 40. Id. 
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Complexity science is about building models for contexts in which agent 
heterogeneity and interrelatedness can and usually do influence outcomes. 
Legal scholars have developed descriptive, prescriptive, and ethical models of 
what this approach means for law. 
A. DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES 
Thus far, applying complexity science to legal systems has focused on 
mapping key concepts of complexity science onto legal systems.41 Consider 
the general definition of a complex adaptive system mentioned above: a large 
network of components, with no central control and simple rules of 
operation, giving rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated 
information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution. Anyone 
with training in law can easily map this framework onto the legal system. The 
legal system’s components comprise a broad diversity of institutions—the 
organizations of people who make, interpret, and enforce laws—and of 
instruments—the laws, regulations, cases, and related legal content the 
institutions produce.42 These components are interconnected and 
interactive. Institutions are interconnected through structures and rules such 
as hierarchies of courts and legislative creation and oversight of agencies; 
institutions interact in forums such as judicial trials, legislative hearings and 
debates, and agency rulemakings. The instruments also are interconnected 
through mechanisms such as code structures, and they interact through cross-
references and other devices. 
The highly interconnected architecture of such a system drives the way it 
behaves over time. An agency adopts a rule, which prompts another agency 
to enforce a different rule, which leads to litigation before a judge, who issues 
an opinion overruled by a higher court, which prompts a legislature to enact 
a new statute, and so on. The institutional agents follow procedural rules (e.g., 
notice and comment), and even the instrumental agents have rules for rules 
(e.g., canons of statutory construction), but there is no central controller 
pulling all the strings. There are hierarchies for various institutions (e.g., 
courts) and instruments (e.g., federal preemption). Yet there is no master 
agent controlling the system. 
 
 41. The discussion and examples of legal complexity in this Subpart draw from Ruhl, supra 
note 37, at 565–69. 
 42. There are, of course, many different ways and terms used to describe the legal system, 
but for our purposes, what matters is the components, and it is quite common for legal scholars 
to speak of legal institutions and instruments in the way we use the terms to describe and discuss 
the legal system. Searches for the two terms in Westlaw’s Law Review and Journals library turn up 
thousands of documents. For our purposes, we can put aside the question of what institutions and 
instruments are in or out of the legal system; what is important for now is that there is a collection 
of such components society calls “the legal system.” See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 488–92, 497–502 
(describing a systems analysis method for defining legal system boundaries); Webb, Exploring System 
Boundaries, supra note 6, at 133–35 (comparing complexity science and autopoiesis models of legal 
system boundaries). 
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The descriptive branch of legal complexity theory has focused on this 
kind of mapping exercise to demonstrate the legal system’s complexity by 
examining how each attribute of complex adaptive systems described in 
complexity science research finds close parallels in legal system structure and 
behavior.43 One dominant attribute of a complex adaptive system is feedback 
between the system components—the connections among which information 
flows to trigger responses.44 Another important property, driven largely by 
intercomponent feedback, is emergence, the core idea of which is that the 
system exhibits macroscopic behavior that could not be predicted by 
examining the system components, interconnections, and interactions at 
microscopic scales.45 In more technical terms, emergence is defined as 
“complicated global patterns emerging from local or individual interaction 
rules between parts of a system.”46 A third central property of complex 
adaptive systems is self-organized structure, such that, as system scale grows, 
the system organizes spontaneously (with no central controller or plan) 
around a set of deep structural rules that lend stability to the system 
behavior.47 These three key system attributes produce complex systems’ 
adaptive capacity and promote their evolution over time,48 which is at least in 
 
 43. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 6, at 898–901 (depicting a chart showing general features of 
complex adaptive systems and how each is found in legal systems); see also PAUL CILLIERS, 
COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM: UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 119–23 (1998) (listing 
complex adaptive system attributes found in social systems generally); Webb, Law, Ethics, and 
Complexity, supra note 6, at 232–38 (mapping six features of complex adaptive systems onto legal 
systems). See generally Thomas E. Webb, Tracing an Outline of Legal Complexity, 27 RATIO JURIS 477 
(2014) [hereinafter Webb, Tracing an Outline of Legal Complexity] (relating complexity science 
principles to legal systems from the perspectives of inside the system, the boundary with the 
external environment, the external environment, and the coevolving system of systems as a whole). 
 44. Feedback loops allow the system to “restructure, or at least modify, the interaction 
pattern among its variables.” JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING THE PARADOXICAL 
WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF SURPRISE 271 (1994). Such feedback loops can become 
exponential in effect and thus dominate the system in which they operate. See Douglas S. Robertson 
& Michael C. Grant, Feedback and Chaos in Darwinian Evolution, 2 COMPLEXITY 10, 12–14 (1996). 
For more on feedback as a complexity metric, see infra Part III.B. 
 45. MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 12–13. 
 46. P.-M. Binder, Frustration in Complexity, 320 SCI. 322, 322 (2008). For more on 
emergence as a complexity metric, see infra Part III.B. 
 47. Self-organized structure is “a generic pattern of self-organized nonequilibrium behavior 
in which there are characteristic long-range temporal and spatial regularities.” PETER COVENEY & 
ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY: THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN A CHAOTIC WORLD 432 
(1995). For some of the foundational work on self-organization properties in physical, biological, 
and social complex adaptive systems, see generally PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE 
OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE 
SEARCH FOR THE LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY (1995); and KRUGMAN, supra 
note 23. For more on self-organization as a complexity metric, see infra Part III.B. 
 48. Adaptation is associated with the feedback and feedforward loops made possible by 
multiple paths of interactions between system components and thus “is an emergent property 
which spontaneously arises through the interaction of simple components.” JAMES GLEICK, 
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 339 n.314 (1987). 
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part a product of coevolution with other complex adaptive systems in its 
environment.49 The legal system, for example, does not operate in a 
vacuum—it influences, and is influenced by, other social, technological, 
physical, and biological systems. 
Legal complexity scholars have argued that these properties can be 
found throughout legal systems, such as in the common law’s development of 
foundational doctrinal rules over time.50 Indeed, Stuart Kauffman, one of the 
leading thinkers in complexity science since its early development in the 
1990s, used the common law as an example of complex adaptive system 
behavior.51 The judiciary’s hierarchical structure and practice of stare decisis 
link courts with courts and opinions with opinions in ways that produce 
complicated and complex (as we define it) feedback connections.52 The 
“substantive jurisprudence” emerges from this system through a process of 
gradual development and evolution of doctrine based on bedrock principles, 
some of which were set down centuries ago. Although one must read the cases 
to know the common law of, say, property, the common law of property is 
something more than just the sum of the cases. The Restatement of Property, for 
example, is more than a case reporter—it is the product of tremendous effort 
by property law experts working over many decades to synthesize and 
compress case law into emergent, macro-scale doctrinal themes and 
structures, as well specific micro-scale rules and principles. 
Notwithstanding claims to the contrary,53 there have been numerous 
accounts of complex adaptive system attributes in a broad range of legal 
systems including administrative law,54 mediation and alternative dispute 
 
 49. See Mikhail Prokopenko et al., An Information-Theoretic Primer on Complexity, Self-
Organization, and Emergence, 15 COMPLEXITY 11, 23–24 (2008) (describing adaptation and 
evolution in complex adaptive systems). See generally KAUFFMAN, supra note 47 (outlining a theory 
of coevolution of complex adaptive systems). 
 50. See Daniel Martin Katz et al., Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the 
American Law Professoriate, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76, 97 (2011); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using 
Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1469–72 (1996). 
 51. KAUFFMAN, supra note 47, at 169. 
 52. See generally Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1 (2011). 
 53. See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 8 (“Political scientists have made some use of systems 
theory, but legal applications are few and far between.”); Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? 
Foreign Investment Law as a Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 
ICSID REV. 372, 375 n.27 (2014) (“Few studies have applied complexity theory to law.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 913 (2005). 
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resolution,55 bankruptcy law,56 environmental law,57 business law,58 
international law,59 land-use regulation law,60 intellectual property law,61 
international development law,62 regulation of the internet,63 the law of war,64 
health law,65 and telecommunications regulation,66 as well as in more general 
accounts of legal systems.67 It is beyond this Article’s scope to articulate all 
such examples—the point is that these scholarly contributions have 
established a robust descriptive model of legal systems as complex adaptive 
systems. 
It is appropriate to pause here and ask the critic’s question: So what? 
Accepting for now that the attributes of complex adaptive systems map well 
onto legal systems, what is the value of having a robust descriptive model of 
 
 55. See, e.g., Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1017 (2004). 
 56. See, e.g., Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in 
Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357 (2005); Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal 
Systems: Precedent and Variation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483. 
 57. See, e.g., Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex 
Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (1996). 
 58. See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management 
Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998). 
 59. See, e.g., Mark D. Belcher & James W. Newton, International Legal Development: A Complex 
Problem Deserving of a “Complex” Solution and Implications for the CAFTA Region, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE 
AM. 189 (2006); Rakhyun E. Kim & Brendan Mackey, International Environmental Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System, 14 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 5 (2014); Pauwelyn, supra note 53. 
 60. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law 
Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 61. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Organizational Code: A Complexity Theory Perspective on 
Technology and Intellectual Property Regulation, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, at xiii (2006); Deborah 
Tussey, Music at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Systems Perspective on File Sharing, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
147 (2005). 
 62. See, e.g., Belcher & Newton, supra note 59. 
 63. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2005); David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every 
Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1055 (1998). 
 64. See, e.g., Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory 
and the Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 595 (2013). 
 65. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389 (2009). 
 66. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving 
Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369 (2007); Susan P. 
Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603 (2003). 
 67. See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity, and 
the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 942–75 (1994); David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the 
Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000) 
(discussing complexity theory); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 641 (1996) (discussing chaos theory, path dependence, and modern evolution theory as 
applied to law and economics); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-
and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 849 (1996); Ruhl, supra note 6; Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity, supra note 6, at 227–38; 
Webb, Tracing an Outline of Legal Complexity, supra note 43. 
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legal systems as complex adaptive systems? The value of such a model is that 
it changes perspective and leads to new questions. To paraphrase how Brian 
Arthur, a leading thinker in applying complexity science to economics, 
described the impact of complexity science in economics: 
[T]his new approach is not just an extension of standard [legal 
theory], nor does it consist of adding agent-based behavior to 
standard models. It is a different way of seeing the [legal system]. It 
gives a different view, one where actions and strategies constantly 
evolve, where time becomes important, where structures constantly 
form and re-form, where phenomena appear that are not visible to 
standard equilibrium analysis, and where a meso-layer between the 
micro and the macro becomes important.68 
In other words, the descriptive model of legal systems as complex adaptive 
systems provides a different perspective on legal systems. Admittedly, thus far 
the model has been constructed based on intuition, analogy, and example, 
but that by no means makes it unusual in the world of legal theory. Either you 
are persuaded on that basis or not, but we will proceed for now on the 
assumption that there is theoretical coherence to the model. The obvious 
next question is what to do with it. 
B. PRESCRIPTIVE THEORIES 
If the legal system is a complex adaptive system, how should legal agents 
and society at large act in such a system? An important point—one that cannot 
be overemphasized—is that describing the legal system as a complex adaptive 
system assumes no normative position about complex adaptive systems or 
legal systems. Instead, describing the legal system as a complex adaptive 
system is merely an observation about the way the legal system is constructed 
and behaves. Assuming that as a given, however, the nature of the legal system 
as a social system means that, unlike complex physical and biological systems, 
humans have a say in how it is designed and operated. Hence, as legal 
theorists constructed the descriptive model of legal complexity, they also 
turned to normative questions about the model’s implications for legal system 
structure and performance. 
This inquiry is distinct from the separate but related question of how to 
design legal systems given that their target regulatory subject is often a 
complex adaptive system. Ecosystems, for example, are classic examples of a 
 
 68. W. BRIAN ARTHUR, Complexity Economics: A Different Framework for Economic Thought, in 
COMPLEXITY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 2 (2015) (explaining the significance of the development of 
what he calls the “complexity economics” model). We have replaced his references to economic 
terms with the analogous legal terms. Cf. id. 
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complex adaptive system.69 Therefore, it makes sense to think that the design 
of legal regimes intended to manage human interaction with ecosystems 
should consider that property.70 This may counsel in favor of certain kinds of 
legal regimes, such as market-based instruments or adaptive management 
procedures, which may mesh better with the dynamic properties of 
ecosystems.71 Similar prescriptive accounts have been made in a wide variety 
of legal fields.72 But both sides of the equation must be taken into account. 
Law itself is a complex adaptive system, and it necessarily influences and is 
influenced by the systems it is intended to regulate or manage.73 Hence, a 
principal concern of legal theorists interested in legal complexity has been to 
develop some sense of how best to respond to the legal system’s complexity, 
considering that the legal system is just one member of a “system of systems.”74 
One consequence of understanding the “system of systems” nature of 
legal regimes is the appreciation that tinkering may open up a huge can of 
worms. Thinking by analogy, consider what can happen in a biological 
ecosystem if a nonnative species is introduced, as humans have often done for 
what were believed to be good reasons. Often the species does not survive. 
Sometimes, though, the introduced species takes hold in its new environment 
and all chaos breaks loose.75 The lesson is that intervening in a complex 
adaptive system is a risky venture. Yet, with the legal system, sometimes there 
 
 69. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up 
the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 953–58 (1997) 
(surveying the science of ecosystem complexity). 
 70. See id. at 967–79. 
 71. See id. at 980–1000. For a sweeping history of legal scholarship on why and how 
environmental law must account for the complex adaptive system properties of the environment, 
see generally Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Think About Complex Environmental Systems in 
Environmental and Natural Resource Law and Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 24 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87 (2013). For similar treatments in general and applied contexts, see 
Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1405 (2011); and Barbara Cosens, Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Backdrop for Natural 
Resource Management: Flood Management in the Columbia River Basin, 42 ENVTL. L. 241 (2012). 
 72. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 537 (2012) (discussing how finance law regulates complex financial markets); Debra 
Gerardi, The Culture of Health Care: How Professional and Organizational Cultures Impact Conflict 
Management, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 857 (2005) (discussing how health care law regulates complex 
health care organizations); Richard E. Myers II, Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 
N.C. L. REV. 1849 (2011) (discussing how criminal law regulates complex behaviors). 
 73. See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 66, at 371 (arguing “that if the telecommunications sector 
and the legal/policymaking institutions are viewed as coevolving and complex adaptive systems, 
then there are important implications for regulatory policy”); Crandall, supra note 64, at 608–14, 
639–41 (arguing that war and the law are interdependent complex adaptive systems). 
 74. For a summary of systems theory study of systems of systems, see Mary Ann Allison et al., 
The Characteristics and Emerging Behaviors of System of Systems, NEW ENG. COMPLEX SYS. INST., 
http://necsi.edu/education/oneweek/winter05/NECSISoS.pdf. 
 75. So much so that an extensive legal regime has arisen devoted to the invasive species 
problem. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, J.B. RUHL & KALYANI ROBBINS, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND 
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 1197–284 (3d ed. 2013) (devoting full chapter to invasive species law). 
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is no choice given the external set of social norms the legal system should 
fulfill. If the legal system is producing normatively poor results, something 
should be done. 
Hence, legal complexity theory has worked on designing legal 
institutions and instruments that seem to fit well with complex adaptive system 
attributes. The theoretical premise is not that complexity is necessarily 
normatively good and should be promoted, but that some structural designs 
are less likely to disrupt the complexity dynamics of the system and are more 
likely to work well within the system as a whole and, perhaps as important, to 
facilitate the legal system’s interaction with other complex social systems. The 
operative principle is that the legal system should be designed with its 
complexity in mind. 
The main thrust of this prescriptive branch of legal complexity theory is 
a deep skepticism that top-down, centralized regulation can avoid unintended 
consequences or keep up with the co-evolving systems, and that more flexible, 
decentralized forms of governance fit better with the legal complexity model. 
For example, administrative law expert Donald Hornstein argues that 
understanding regulatory law as a complex adaptive system counsels in favor 
of relying more on the distributed power of states for policy formulation and 
for making federal administrative agency governance more experimental, 
adaptive, and collaborative.76 Similarly, telecommunications law expert 
Barbara Cherry argues that rapid technological, social, and economic 
change—systems co-evolving with law—demand a more adaptive governance 
structure.77 Cherry also argues that wholesale deregulation as a means of 
“simplifying” legal regimes can lead to disastrous results due to complex 
system cascade effects. Instead, building regulatory resilience—the capacity 
to withstand shocks from technology and other systems—should be the 
priority.78 
The answer to legal complexity, in other words, is not to hack away at the 
legal system and declare victory in the campaign for legal simplification. 
Rather, these scholars and other legal complexity theorists focus on offering 
prescriptive advice to build adaptability and resilience into legal systems to 
keep pace with co-evolving social, technological, physical, and biological 
systems. The predominant view among legal complexity theorists is that law 
cannot deregulate its way there, nor can it command-and-control its way 
there.79 There are no easy answers—how to put law’s complexity to work will 
 
 76. Hornstein, supra note 54, at 915–16, 934–60. 
 77. See Barbara A. Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under Complexity: Providing 
Resilience Within the Rule of Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 19–31 (2008). 
 78. See id. at 3–18. For an overview of resilience theory as applied in legal systems, see 
generally J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—
with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373 (2011). 
 79. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing Ecological Conditions, 42 
ENVTL. L. 93, 108–09 (2012) (arguing that climate change requires the adoption of complex 
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be quite the challenge for legal design, particularly if there are no reliable 
metrics for assessing how the legal system performs as a complex adaptive 
system. 
C. ETHICAL THEORIES 
Some legal complexity theorists have gone beyond descriptive and 
prescriptive accounts of legal system design to examine the ethical 
implications of viewing law as a complex adaptive system. As Julian Webb 
suggests, one might conclude from the descriptive and prescriptive theories 
that “we have little choice but to accept that the system will organize and adapt 
itself in the manner most likely to ensure its survival,” and thus “resistance to 
law is likely to achieve little or no immediate gain.” But Webb offers an 
alternative to this pessimistic view, arguing that “[c]omplexity . . . emphasizes 
the distributed nature of power; the inability of any person (or institution) to 
claim that it exerts control over society.” The upshot of this is that “we have 
to take responsibility for the effects of all our decisions.”80 
Exercising that responsibility, argues Webb, implicates three overarching 
principles. First, an appreciation of legal complexity confirms why “the law 
delivers justice as much by accident as by design,” but also “encourage[s] 
emancipatory movements to embrace the uncertainty this provides.”81 
Second, complexity science reveals the interconnectedness of seemingly self-
referentially closed social systems, meaning that “a failure to achieve 
normative consistency between systems will generate system-conflicts.”82 
Lastly, Webb argues that activating certain ethical values consistent with 
complex adaptive system behavior, such as altruism, pluralism, and 
interdependence, will support the maintenance and development of the legal 
system.83 In short, Webb’s take on the ethical implications of legal complexity 
calls for polity-wide responsibility and participation in the legal system and a 
deep reexamination of fundamental ethical notions of power, rights, and 
rules.84 But the question remains: How, exactly, should such ethical principles 
 
adaptive governance systems and that market-based, rather than centrally controlled regulation, 
will be more adaptive); Cherry, supra note 66, at 372 (“An important implication of the 
complexity theory perspective is that policies of complete federal preemption, and particularly 
full deregulation, must be approached with great caution.”). 
 80. Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity, supra note 6, at 238, 241; see also Palma Joy Strand, 
Law as Story: A Civic Concept of Law (with Constitutional Illustrations), 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 603, 
627 (2009) (noting legal complexity means “all the individuals in the society are responsible for 
the content of law”). 
 81. Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity, supra note 6, at 239. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 240; see also CILLIERS, supra note 43, at 111 (noting legal complexity requires 
altruistic and decentralized governance). 
 84. Webb, Law, Ethics, and Complexity, supra note 6, at 242 (“Complexity also begs a re-
analysis of meta-concepts like ‘rights’ . . . . How do we regard (legal) rules that breach our 
expectations of moral legitimacy?”); see also CILLIERS, supra note 43, at 139 (noting in a complex 
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be operationalized in concert with legal complexity if there is no reliable way 
of measuring legal complexity? 
III. MEASURING LEGAL COMPLEXITY 
The descriptive, prescriptive, and ethical theories of legal complexity rely 
largely on intuition, analogy, and example for their persuasion. This 
approach has taken the legal complexity project far, but the path has come to 
an end. What else is there to say about legal complexity that derives from 
intuition, analogy, and example? Not much. Now that it is developed, the core 
theory of legal complexity can be used as a lens to examine different fields of 
law or legal problems, but this leads to little theoretical advancement. Rather, 
this technique maps the theory onto author-selected contexts and elaborates 
on why legal complexity is a useful model for understanding how the discrete 
legal context is operating. To be sure, it is essential when working out a theory 
to compare hypotheses to the real world by intuition, analogy, and example. 
If a theory does not cohere at that level, it is probably not worth pursuing. But 
we believe it is fair to conclude that the theory of legal complexity has been 
sufficiently tested at this level to confirm it is worth pursuing further. So, what 
is the next step in that cause? 
As with any posited theory, the next step for legal-complexity theory is to 
respond to the critic’s demand for empirical proof (e.g., prove the Tax Code 
is too complex). Asking that a theory withstand empirical testing is not an idle 
or obstructionist demand. Particularly when normative claims are based on a 
theory, those making the claims should be expected to offer support beyond 
mere elegance or intuitive appeal. If one believes legal complexity imposes 
constraints on the legal system or, conversely, that it opens up tremendous 
opportunities, one should want to know when, where, and by how much 
complexity activates those conditions. And if one believes legal complexity 
justifies using adaptive approaches to respond to those constraints, when, 
where, and through what means should the law be adaptive? If the quality and 
quantity of legal complexity matters for either of those questions, how are the 
quality and quantity of legal complexity measured and described? These are 
questions one should naturally ask of legal-complexity theorists making 
normative claims about what the theory means for legal-system design and 
behavior. If the theory is to produce answers to such questions, legal-
complexity theorists must initiate an empirical phase of study. 
The first step in such an undertaking is to design and field test a set of 
relevant system metrics and methods to measure legal complexity. 
Unfortunately, complexity science has arrived at no standard kit of metrics or 
 
legal system, “[t]o behave ethically means not to follow rules blindly—to merely calculate—but 
to follow them responsibly, which may imply that the rules must be broken”). 
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methods, but a synthesis of various accounts by complexity scientists,85 and by 
the few legal scholars (including one of us) that have explored legal 
complexity empirics,86 suggests several dominant themes we believe will be 
most useful for studying legal complexity. We divide these into a system-
structure set and a system-behavior set. 
A. COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE 
1. Agents and Agent Sets: Composition, Classification, and Diversity 
Complex systems’ development and evolution can be described as an 
“ecosystem.”87 This archetype is a useful descriptor of the rich and complex 
dynamics underlying law’s evolution. However, in order to advance such 
statements beyond mere metaphor, it is necessary to retrofit and apply 
rigorous tools from appropriate intellectual domains such as systems ecology, 
physics, biology, and complex systems. One threshold step in the process of 
characterizing the broader landscape is to identify all potential agents whose 
individual behavior might impact the collective behavior of the broader 
system. 
The law, like other complex adaptive systems, exhibits a diversity of 
agents and agent sets.88 The set of all potential agents is vast and includes 
institutions (i.e., courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, corporations, 
public interest organizations, etc.); individual actors (i.e., judges, legislators, 
lobbyist, bureaucrats, etc.); and the law itself (i.e., rules, adjudications, 
decisions, etc.). 
Individual agents often belong to agent sets and those agent sets can 
themselves be nested within broader agent sets. The nested nature of agent 
sets is an important complication that must be confronted in the process of 
deconstructing and measuring legal complexity. At the same time, such 
theoretic representations of the respective agent sets can be a useful manner 
through which to begin exploring the operation and dynamics of the 
respective complex adaptive system. 
 
 85. In addition to the numerous references cited in following footnotes, see generally 
MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 94–111; and Carlos Gershenson & Nelson Fernández, Complexity and 
Information: Measuring Emergence, Self-Organization, and Homeostasis at Multiple Scales, 18 
COMPLEXITY 29 (2012). 
 86. See, e.g., Michael J. Bommarito & Daniel M. Katz, A Mathematical Approach to the Study of 
the United States Code, 389 PHYSICA A 4195 (2010); Katz & Bommarito, supra note 17; Daniel M. 
Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457 (2010); see also Romain Boulet et al., Network Analysis of the French 
Environmental Code, in AI APPROACHES TO THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 39 (Pompeu 
Casanovas et al. eds., 2010). 
 87. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 
(2005). 
 88. See supra Part II.A. 
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With the basic identification step in place, an agent-centric metric thus 
would classify the respective legal agent sets by segmenting them and placing 
them in a broader taxonomy of agents and agent sets. This classification step 
is itself complex because it requires the development of categories whose 
boundaries are typically difficult to cleanly segment. Additionally, the 
categories themselves usually require a researcher or other interested party to 
engage in some form of dimension reduction.89 
The set of agents may be (and often is) quite diverse. There is a variety 
of measures to assess the diversity of a particular set of agents and agent sets. 
Both an absolute and comparative question, an agent-centric diversity 
measure could illuminate a variety of interesting research questions. In 
addition to evaluating individual time slices, an agent diversity measure which 
identifies temporal changes in the diversity of the respective agent set could 
actually highlight other important changes in the evolution of the broader 
law or law-generating process. 
2. Formal Architecture: Trees and Other Formal Hierarchies 
The sheer number of agents offers just a partial characterization of the 
overall complexity of a given complex adaptive system. Agents are connected 
in a variety of ways, including by formal architectures that serve specific 
purposes and functions. Formal architecture is an important default 
proposition for any complex system, helping set some contours of its 
performance and offering a partial description of its behavior and topology. 
Formal hierarchical architecture is typically represented in a structure 
known as a tree. Trees are a well-studied mathematical structure that can be 
“widely used as [graphs or] data structures in computer science.”90 Trees are 
comprised of nodes which are connected by branches. Conceptualized as a 
graph, a tree is a connected, undirected graph with no simple circuits. 
Direction only flows one way; each node and branch is associated with a level, 
with levels starting at the root node and terminating at the leaf nodes. These 
are important features that distinguish a tree from other graphs (such as those 
typically studied in network science). 
Typically the byproduct of system designers or instantiated by formal 
rules, tree-based architecture is designed to serve important functions. Those 
functions might be institutional or they might serve as a means to help make 
sense of a given system’s complexity. 
 
 89. For anything other than a trivial problem, the mapping from n dimensional space to a 
smaller dimensional space (typically 2D or 3D space) represents some loss of information. The 
question is, how much? This depends upon how much loading there is on the initial dimensions. 
 90. See Joe Malkevitch, Trees: A Mathematical Tool for All Seasons, AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y: 
FEATURE COLUMN, http://www.ams.org/samplings/feature-column/fcarc-trees (last visited Sept. 
14, 2015); see also Eric W. Weisstein, Tree, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram. 
com/Tree.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
A5_RUHL&KATZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2015  8:54 AM 
214 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:191 
For an institutional example, consider the American federal judiciary. 
The federal judiciary features a formal hierarchy of judges and judicial staff 
whose collective behavior help shape “the path of the law.”91 The basic formal 
hierarchy is memorialized in the formal multi-tier structure that begins with 
federal magistrate judges and terminates with the United States Supreme 
Court. Figure 1 offers a simple version of this formal tree-based hierarchy. 
 
Figure 1. The Federal Judicial Hierarchy 
 
For a similar case, consider the well-known West Key Number System. As 
displayed in Figure 2, the West Key Number System is a tree-based 
architecture designed to categorize the space of legal concepts. This is a 
hierarchical method of organizing the law into categories that make it easier 
for actors inside the legal system to understand and navigate it. In Figure 2, 
higher-order legal concepts are located above lower level concepts. Those 
seeking to learn about a narrow question can both identify directly relevant 
information as well as learn about surrounding higher level ideas under which 
their discrete question is located. Like all taxonomies, these categories are 
obviously not hermetic, and an alternative structure could potentially be 
developed. However, the existing divisions in a taxonomy such as the West 
Key Number System point to the sort of latent organizational structure that 
many hold in their minds (even if it is never formalized). Although it is a 
proxy to the question, the complexity of this structure illustrates the 
 
 91. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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complexity of the conceptual space being modeled as more distinctions in the 
law generate greater and greater numbers of potential category distinctions. 
 
Figure 2. West Key Number System 
 
For both of these examples, as well as for other tree-based hierarchies, 
the goal is to develop appropriate measures that allow a researcher to 
characterize the complexity of the respective space.92 In terms of metrics, 
simple measures such as tree depth can highlight the level of intricacy present 
in a given architecture.93 The ratio between the breadth (i.e., width) and 
depth (i.e., flatness) of a tree can illuminate the extent of hierarchy present 
in a given context. For example, the width of a tree might indicate the 
grouping of a highly diverse set of objects that cannot otherwise be combined 
in the nested categories. One potentially interesting set of measures would 
center upon the inequality and stratification within and across various agent 
sets. What is the average distance between each leaf node and the root node 
of the tree? One could also consider other moments (e.g., variance, skewness, 
and kurtosis) of that distribution as it would illuminate other properties of 
the nature of authority in the broader complex system. 
 
 92. In a real sense, taxonomies such as the West Key Number System help partially represent 
the law’s phylogenetic structure. The complexity of such trees can also be leveraged in a variety 
of scientific inquiries. See, e.g., Louis J. Billera et al., Geometry of the Space of Phylogenetic Trees, 27 
ADVANCES APPLIED MATHEMATICS 733 (2001); John P. Huelsenbeck & Fredrik Ronquist, 
MRBAYES: Bayesian Inference of Phylogenetic Trees, 17 BIOINFORMATICS 754 (2001); Hasan H. Otu 
& Khalid Sayood, A New Sequence Distance Measure for Phylogenetic Tree Construction, 19 
BIOINFORMATICS 2122 (2003). 
 93. In principle, it could cut either way. However, in general, the distinctions might be 
helpful in understanding, or they may make it harder to understand the overall complex system. 
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3. Network Architecture: Emergent Hierarchies 
Complex system architectures take on a variety of flavors and complex 
adaptive systems exhibit multi-scalar hierarchies, organizations, and other 
structural forms within which the agents are distributed.94 As a matter of 
system evolution, there are two forces typically in constant operation—forces 
building up hierarchies and forces operating to tear those very hierarchies 
down. At any given moment, these countervailing dynamics operate to yield 
different kinds of observed structures. 
The tree conception has some important limitations, but many 
limitations are overcome by considering the interconnectedness (network) 
that exists between respective objects. As recently noted, “hierarchies emerge 
and occur widely in self-organizing and evolutionary systems, such as food 
webs (ecological), neural networks (biological), open-source software 
(technological), and industrial production networks (economic).”95 This is 
equally applicable to describing legal systems.96 Hierarchy is a fundamental 
feature of legal systems, but the nature of that hierarchy is likely to vary across 
particular agents and agent sets. 
Hierarchies are typically not the byproduct of a random process. Quite 
the opposite, their forms are the consequence of specific underlying 
generating dynamics. While hierarchies can be the byproduct of choices by 
system designers, they more commonly emerge as a result of actions 
undertaken by agents. Thus, observed system architecture is usually not the 
function of top-down choices made by a system designer, but rather the 
aggregate byproduct of bottom-up decisions offered by various agents and 
agent sets. Thus, in addition to the formal hierarchies discussed above, there 
are emergent hierarchies that develop through a series of micro-choices made 
by the respective actors. Such emergent hierarchies operate alongside any 
nominal hierarchy that might also exist, thereby confounding one’s ability to 
understand the dynamics and predict the behavior of a given system. 
Consider again the federal judiciary. The formal tree-based hierarchy 
displayed in Figure 1 does not fully capture the true state of social and 
professional authority carried by the respective agents. Although judges at 
each level of the federal judiciary hierarchy would appear to possess equal 
 
 94. For various examples, see generally Stefano Boccaletti et al., Complex Networks: Structure 
and Dynamics, 424 PHYSICS REP. 175 (2006); Phillip Bonacich, Power and Centrality: A Family of 
Measures, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1170 (1987); David A. Lake, Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and 
Hierarchy in World Politics, 32 INT’L SECURITY 47 (2007); Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network 
Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 57 (1998); and M. Puck Rombach et al., 74 SIAM J. ON 
APPLIED MATHEMATICS 167 (2014). 
 95. Jianxi Luo & Christopher L. Magee, Detecting Evolving Patterns of Self‐Organizing Networks 
by Flow Hierarchy Measurement, 16 COMPLEXITY 53, 53 (2011). 
 96. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
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levels of authority, the social authority of these jurists is far from equal.97 
While each jurist’s decisions are important to the individual litigators that 
appear before the judge, most judges cannot be said to have a lasting and 
prolonged effect on the development of the law. Indeed, “[e]ven a casual 
observer would recognize that although many jurists’ views are quickly 
forgotten, the views of a selected few persist.”98 Whether one agrees with their 
particular decisions, it is difficult to deny the distinct and lasting legacies of 
federal judges such as Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, Henry Friendly, Richard 
Posner, Abner Mikva, and J. Skelly Wright as well as Supreme Court Justices 
such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, Earl Warren, Roger Taney, 
Louis Brandeis, and Joseph Story. 
Figure 3 offers a partial picture of the informal, network-based hierarchy 
present in the federal judiciary. Consistent with the coloring offered in Figure 
1 above, yellow nodes are members of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, green nodes are members of the United States Court of Appeals, and 
blue nodes are United States District Court judges. Edges are built from the 
flow of law clerks from one jurist to another.99 A simple ocular review reveals 
a structure that is far from a random graph. This is a portrait of inequality, 
and that inequality is a function of several micro-level choices made by 
individual jurists. These choices yield a social structure where some jurists’ 
social authority far outstrips their formal rank. As such, they may exert more 
social control than a jurist who is normally ranked above them. In other 
words, there are certain district court judges whose social authority appears 
to outstrip at least some of their circuit court counterparts. It also leads one 
to consider provocative questions such as whether well-known circuit court 
judges such as Richard Posner have more authority over the long term 
development of the law than some justices on the United States Supreme 
Court. Of course, Figure 3 offers only a snapshot of the social structure of the 
American federal judiciary at a given moment in time. The landscape is 
dynamic and the prestige hierarchy shifts. “[R]eputation effects, esteem, 
prestige, and influence are undoubtedly generated through dynamic 
processes that include negative and positive feedback.”100 
 
 
 97. Our best understanding is that the authority follows some form of extremely skewed 
distribution (i.e., power, law, etc.). 
 98. See Katz & Stafford, supra note 86, at 461–62 n.10. 
 99. Id. at 461. 
 100. Id. 
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Figure 3. The Emergent Federal Judicial Social Structure 
 
One way to formalize this emergent architecture is through the tools of 
network science (applied graph theory).101 Networks consist of nodes that 
can, for example, in the simple case represent actors, institutions, and 
documents. The connections between these nodes are represented by edges 
(bidirectional) or arcs (unidirectional). Such connections can memorialize 
simple binary {0, 1} connections or can be weighted to represent far more 
sophisticated types of relationships. Network science is among the fastest 
growing fields in all of science and includes scholarship in wide-ranging 
 
 101. See generally ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO 
EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2003); 
DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003); David Lazer et al., 
Life Computational Social Science, 323 SCI. 721 (2009). 
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disciplines such as physics,102 sociology,103 political science,104 public health,105 
economics,106 and law.107 
The application of network-science tools to legal systems has revealed 
some interesting and illuminating patterns. The law’s most well-studied form 
of emergent architecture is a documented tendency of legal systems and 
agents to display self-similar, or fractal, properties.108 This tendency extends 
 
 102. See, e.g., Albert-László Barabási, Network Science, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. 1 
(2013); Albert-László Barabási & Reka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 SCI. 
509 (1999); Michael J. Bommarito, Daniel Martin Katz, Jonathan Zelner & James Fowler, Distance 
Measures for Dynamic Citation Networks, 389 PHYSICA A 4201 (2010); M. Girvan & M.E.J. Newman, 
Community Structure in Social and Biological Networks, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7821 (2002); 
Duncan J. Watts & Stephen H. Strogatz, Letter, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks, 393 
NATURE 440 (1998). 
 103. See, e.g., RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 
(1995); Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973); Stanley Milgram, 
The Small-World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61 (1967); John Padgett & Christopher K. Ansell, 
Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1259 (1993). 
 104. See, e.g., Lada A. Adamic & Natalie Glance, The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. 
Election: Divided They Blog, 3 INT’L WORKSHOP ON LINK DISCOVERY 36 (2005); James H. Fowler, 
Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 456 (2006). 
 105. See, e.g., Lisa F. Berkman & Thomas Glass, Social Integration, Social Networks, Social Support, 
and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 137 (Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000); 
Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in a Large Social 
Network, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2249 (2008); Jonathan L. Zelner et al., Social Connectedness and 
Disease Transmission: Social Organization, Cohesion, Village Context, and Infection Risk in Rural Ecuador, 
102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2233 (2012). 
 106. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Bayesian Learning in Social Networks, 78 REV. ECON. STUD. 
1201 (2011); Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Matthew O. Jackson, The Effects of Social Networks on 
Employment and Inequality, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 426 (2004); Benjamin Golub & Matthew O. Jackson, 
How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1287 (2012); 
Sanjeev Goyal et al., Economics: An Emerging Small World, 114 J. POL. ECON. 403 (2006); Sanjeev 
Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, Structural Holes in Social Networks, 137 J. ECON. THEORY 460 
(2007); Dunia López-Pintado, Diffusion in Complex Social Networks, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 573 
(2008); Adalbert Mayer & Steven L. Puller, The Old Boy (and Girl) Network: Social Network Formation 
on University Campuses, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 329 (2008). 
 107. See, e.g., James Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance 
of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007); Katz & Stafford, supra note 
86; Katz et al., supra note 50; Post & Eisen, supra note 67; Thomas A. Smith, The Web of the Law, 
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309 (2007); Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: 
An Overview and an Application to the ‘Patent Explosion,’ 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293 (2007); 
Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Patent Citation Networks Revisited: Signs of a Twenty-First Century 
Change?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1657 (2009). 
 108. See Daniel Martin Katz, How Long is the Coastline of the Law: Additional Thoughts on the 
Fractal Nature of Legal Systems [Repost], COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUD. (May 13, 2011), http:// 
computationallegalstudies.com/2011/05/13/how-long-is-the-coastline-of-the-law-additional-
thoughts-on-the-fractal-nature-of-legal-systems-repost. 
Fractal geometry was developed in a set of classic papers by the late mathematician 
Benoît Mandelbrot. The original paper in the field How Long is the Coastline of Britain 
describes the coastline measurement problem. In short form, the length of the coast 
line is a function of the size of measurement one employs. . . . As a first-order 
description of one important dynamic of the common law, we believe significant 
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to a wide variety of contexts, including cases, judges, law schools, and law 
review articles. The implications for legal theory are significant. One 
important implication is that distance between those cases, judges, law 
schools, and law review articles are highly nonlinear. Focusing upon the cases 
and judges, the distance between an emergent case or judge and the average 
case or judge is extremely large. Indeed, as documented in the literature, the 
social distance is actually exponential.109 
Consider the judicial decision-making and opinion-authorship process. 
Although formal hierarchies exist in the law such as the state or federal 
judicial hierarchy, day-to-day decision-making in legal systems is actually fairly 
decentralized. Individual actors can, in principle, reference whatever relevant 
cases and other sources they choose. Despite such broad discretion, actors 
tend to disproportionately gravitate to small numbers of cases that are 
consistently cited. This micro-tendency toward the familiar and the already 
well regarded yields a macro-prestige hierarchy that is extremely skewed (i.e., 
its degree distribution roughly follows a power law). Sometimes called the 
“Mathew effect,” the “80/20 rule,” or the “rich-get-richer phenomenon,” 
power laws as well as other related skewed distributions are indicative of highly 
uneven social processes. Those with initial resources are able to rapidly 
extend that advantage. As displayed in Figure 4, complex systems scholars 
have documented this trend across a variety of legal systems and associated 
legal institutions. Consider the case of judicial citations. While a small number 
of cases are consistently cited, roughly half of the written decisions in 
American law have never been cited more than once.110 Figure 4 offers 











progress can be made by considering the conditions under which legal systems 
behave in a manner similar to fractals. [Indeed,] a number of important papers have 
discussed the fractal nature of legal systems. 
Id. 
 109. See Katz & Stafford, supra note 86; Post & Eisen, supra note 67; Smith, supra note 107; 
see also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Smith, supra note 107. 
 111. In each of the plots in Figure 4, the x-axis plots the quantity (i.e., number of times cited) 
and the y-axis plots the frequency of that particular quantity throughout the data. 
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Figure 4. Skewed Distribution of Social Authority in Legal Systems112 
 
Beyond the degree distribution, there are a large number of commonly 
used statistics used to characterize the properties of a given network 
(graph).113 These statistics include macro-level statistics, such as average path 
length, clustering coefficients, and density, as well as micro-level statistics such 
as degree, closeness, betweenness, and other related authority measures. Also 
interesting are the mesoscopic graph measures that allow for the 
identification and tracking of particular subgroups and subgraphs (loosely 
called communities). These measures, along with others, can help form the 
basis for more sophisticated composite measures of overall system complexity. 
Legal-complexity theorists need more documentation and a far more 
extensive scientific exploration of these questions. The age of armchair 
theorizing must give way to a new reality with legal theorists applying 
appropriate metrics to help better substantiate their respective claims. The 
good news is that, with respect to measuring legal systems as complex systems, 
legal theorists do not have to go it alone. Scholars in the social, biological, 
and physical sciences have developed methods designed to measure the 
 
 112. Katz et al., supra note 50, at 95 fig.5; Katz & Stafford, supra note 86, at 498 fig.5; Post & 
Eisen, supra note 67, at 574 fig.11; Smith, supra note 107, at 329 fig.8, 335 fig.12; Anton Geist, 
Using Citation Analysis Techniques for Computer-Assisted Legal Research in Continental 
Jurisdictions 82 fig.4 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Edinburgh), https:// 
www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/3511/GeistLLM2009.pdf?sequence=2. 
 113. See generally MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS (2008); M.E.J. 
NEWMAN, NETWORKS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010); THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 
(Mark Newman et al. eds., 2006). 
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extent of hierarchy present in a given context.114 The question properly posed 
is how one might retrofit these existing approaches to identify and measure 
the persistent and differentiable features present in legal systems. In that vein, 
there are a variety of potential measurement strategies or metrics one might 
employ depending upon the specific component or components of the legal 
system one is interested in studying. 
4. Information Storage and Computation 
Complex adaptive systems store and process information.115 The agents 
and architecture described above play an important role in characterizing the 
operation and flow of information undertaken therein. If trees and networks 
represent the architecture and agents are the nodes, then information would 
be the “electrical current” that flows across the respective institutional 
circuitry. The act of processing the information is computation (broadly 
construed). This is true whether the complex system is one’s cognitive 
architecture or the operation of a biological or physical system. 
The strongest version of these ideas leads to a claim of universality (i.e., 
universal computation) whereby every cell, every brain, every person, every 
society, and even the universe itself can be conceptualized as engaging in 
computation. In one sense, this is a trivially true statement—every system is 
engaging in something that might be called computation. However, the 
nontrivial version of the idea is controversial. What is important to remember 
is that one need not assent to the concept of universal computation in order 
to observe the theoretical value of computation as a first-order descriptor of 
a complex system’s behavior. 
In application, legal systems can be conceptualized as computational 
complex systems—systems that store and process information. As it concerns 
this storage and processing task, not all computational complex systems are 
equally complex. Even among otherwise complex systems, there is a spectrum. 
From the characterization above, two classes of information-centric metrics 
present themselves: (1) content measures; and (2) computation measures. 
A content-centric information measure could consider the amount of 
information necessary to fully characterize the content stored in the legal 
 
 114. See, e.g., Andrea Lancichinetti et al., Detecting the Overlapping and Hierarchical Community 
Structure in Complex Networks, 11 NEW J. PHYSICS 033015 (2009); Enys Mones et al., Hierarchy 
Measure for Complex Networks, 7 PLOS ONE e33799 (2012); Marta Sales-Pardo et al., Extracting the 
Hierarchical Organization of Complex Systems, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 15224 (2007); 
Huawei Shen et al., Detect Overlapping and Hierarchical Community Structure in Networks, 388 PHYSICA 
A 1706 (2009). 
 115. See, e.g., HERMANN HAKEN, INFORMATION AND SELF-ORGANIZATION: A MACROSCOPIC 
APPROACH TO COMPLEX SYSTEMS (3d ed. 2010); DIRK HELBING, QUANTITATIVE SOCIODYNAMICS: 
STOCHASTIC METHODS AND MODELS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION PROCESSES (2d ed. 2010); GREGOIRE 
NICOLIS & CATHERINE NICOLIS, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS: EMERGENCE, INFORMATION 
AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2012); Guido Nolte et al., Robustly Estimating the Flow Direction of 
Information in Complex Physical Systems, 100 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 234101 (2008). 
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system. What is the information content contained in a particular body of 
legal rules? How complex is the resulting rules set? 
Law’s complexity is a long-standing social and political issue, and various 
technologies help lawyers and lay persons confront the sheer volume of 
information and overall attendant complexity of legal systems. As the saying 
goes, necessity is the mother of all invention, and the complexity of law has 
necessitated the development of legal information technology as a rational 
and necessary response to law’s complexity. Even in a pre-computing era, the 
hornbooks, digests, restatements, and other related legal treatises can be 
thought of as an early form of legal information technology allowing various 
end users to better understand the law in a given area. In addition, various 
indexing systems and other legal taxonomies—such as the West Key Number 
System discussed above—also represent early forms of legal technology. 
Again, their use allowed an end user to more quickly assemble the relevant 
information content contained therein. 
A related, but distinct, information measure is a computational measure. 
Again, the linkage between information technology and the complexity of the 
law stands ever present. Consider again TurboTax—the popular, consumer-
facing tax preparation software mentioned in Part I. From a complexity 
perspective, TurboTax offers taxpayers a layer between the underlying legal 
rules and the lived experience on behalf of its users. 
More recent developments in legal technology have a similar purpose—
reverse-engineering complex legal processes. Consider, for example, the 
United States Tax Code (Title 26 and its surrounding regulations). As we 
suggested in Part I, to call the Tax Code “complex” is straightforward and 
hardly represents some sort of revelation. Indeed, there exists a cottage 
industry of commentary highlighting this point.116 However, the question is: 
how do its end users experience that complexity? For many end users, legal 
technology and its ability to mediate complexity further complicates the 
picture. 
Complexity in the underlying object may or may not project into 
complexity as experienced by the relevant end user. TurboTax and other 
competing products offer a technology layer sandwiched between the Code 
and the experience of the end user. In a very serious sense, this software is a 
legal user interface. Much like internet browsers shield users from the 
underlying coding language (e.g., HTML and Java) and processes, tax 
preparation software shields users from the underlying complexity in the Tax 
Code. Given this complication, what is the best metric for measuring 
complexity? 
One measure would be of the underlying object—the Tax Code—
through methods discussed above. Another metric could evaluate the average 
experience of an end-user of the Code, such as time to complete, accuracy, 
 
 116. See sources cited supra note 2. 
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or satisfaction. Or, as suggested in Part I, one could measure the complexity 
of the rules and user interface that converts existing legal rules into some sort 
of an executable program used to perform meaningful functions. In other 
words, how complex is the software necessary to represent TurboTax? How 
does this compare to other forms of software that help automate legal 
knowledge? There exists a series of well-regarded software-complexity 
measures, including simple measures such as program size, computational 
complexity, and run-time measures, as well as more complicated measures 
such as Halstead’s complexity measures or McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity 
measures.117 A related measure might consider how much information one 
needs in order to execute the average task and whether that average 
characterization is informative (i.e., what are statistical properties of that 
distribution including its variance, skewness, and kurtosis)? 
B. COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEM BEHAVIOR 
Our interest in legal complexity is in part motivated by our interest in the 
behavior of the legal system and its predictability. Some basic level of 
predictability is an obvious and straightforward normative goal for any legal 
system. The difficulty arises in instances where predictability conflicts with 
other normative goals, such as fairness and various efforts to ensure that the 
law evolves to take account of changes in broader society. In the aggregate, 
various efforts to particularize the law to better distinguish various classes of 
conduct are one important source of legal complexity. In this context, 
complexity arguably serves a positive normative purpose. However, each 
increase in complexity can have unintended consequences including making 
the overall legal system less transparent and less understandable to lay 
persons.118 
As highlighted herein and across the literature, legal systems are complex 
adaptive systems. Our desire to predict system-level behavior must be 
tempered by the realities that are attendant in working with complex adaptive 
systems. There are real limits in our ability to make forecasts. In the general 
case discussing the relationship between system complexity and prediction, 
scholars highlight the distinction between two famous complex systems—
tides and weather. Both feature fairly complex dynamics, but from a 
prediction standpoint, one is easy and the other is hard (in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible). 
For predicting tides, relevant variables include “the Earth’s rotation, the 
topography of the ocean, and the position of the Moon and the Sun relative 
 
 117. See generally Bill Curtis et al., Measuring the Psychological Complexity of Software Maintenance 
Tasks with the Halstead and McCabe Metrics, SE-5 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
96 (1979); Kearney et al., supra note 12. 
 118. See Katz & Bommarito, supra note 17. 
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to Earth.”119 Significant work by well-regarded mathematicians such as Kelvin, 
Poincare, and LaPlace yielded a set of rigorous predictions that have been 
shown to be highly accurate.120 In addition, in many instances, tides patterns 
can be determined well in advance, such that they are printed and distributed 
in books such as tide tables and used by a variety of end users. 
While tides are complex yet predictable, weather systems are complex 
and often unpredictable.121 The specific level of predictability depends the 
dynamics present at a given moment in time. For example, consider 
forecasting the temperature during the summer months in a desert climate. 
From a day-over-day perspective, the expected temperature is fairly stable. By 
contrast, temperate climates are typically more difficult to predict 
(particularly during seasonal transition periods). During the shift from winter 
to spring, such temperate climates can experience wide variations in 
temperature from 25 degrees one day to 75 degrees just a few days later. 
The challenge of weather prediction extends beyond just temperature 
and includes predicting rainstorms and wind patterns. Many scientists have 
studied weather patterns in the hopes of trying to develop more accurate 
forecasts. The pioneering work of Edward Lorenz, however, offers a useful 
caution. Among other things, Lorenz identified how the complex dynamics 
underlying weather systems made longer term forecasting difficult or 
impossible.122 Indeed, outside a 7- to 14-day window, most weather 
predictions do not perform much better than an almanac. 
Taken as a whole, and in many specific instances, legal systems exhibit 
properties that make them behave more like weather and less like tides. 
However, this is merely conjecture (albeit, perhaps, well founded and 
intuitive conjecture). To better evaluate that proposition requires greater 
scientific exploration, characterization, and measurement of legal systems 
and their complexity using appropriate tools. 
Despite these real limitations along a variety of dimensions, it is possible 
to make forecasts about the future behavior of complex systems. Indeed, a 
core portion of lawyers’ professional judgment includes forecasting uncertain 
legal environments. In certain instances, complexity makes this task more 
challenging. The tools used by complex-systems scholars such as networks, 
trees, and computation, and terms such as emergence, path dependence, 
feedback, and diffusion can help those embedded in an environment better 
understand (and hopefully predict) relevant behavior. 
 
 119. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 961 (2013). 
 120. Id.; see also Duncan Watts, The Dream of Prediction: Why You Should Be Skeptical, 2011 YEAR 
REV. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://2011.yearinreview.yahoo.com/2011/blog/8569/ 
predictions-why-you-should-be-skeptical. 
 121. See NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT 
SOME DON’T (2012); Watts, supra note 120. 
 122. See generally EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS (1995). 
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1. Networks, Trees, Diffusion, and System Behavior 
Complex adaptive systems exhibit information processing, feedback, and 
feedforward mechanisms producing structural interconnectedness and 
interdependence between agents throughout the system itself. As discussed 
earlier, a structural metric would construct a model of the legal system’s 
networked agents and structure, showing all interconnections and 
interdependencies, and measure the strengths and directions of information 
feedback and feedforward channels. 
From a behavioral standpoint, the structural properties of a given 
complex system aid in various forms of system prediction. Obviously, there 
are many scopes at which such a forecast might be offered with the high level 
(or coarse grained) properties being far easier than lower level (or fine 
grained) properties. Initially, one can examine the structural properties 
(trees, networks, information, etc.) and then offer an account of the 
evolutionary conditions giving rise to the system as observed at time t. Further, 
it is possible to offer a reasonable forecast of its future behavioral properties, 
as in many instances we care less about the structure of system than the 
information, signal, or pathogen being distributed across its architecture. 
In the context of law, we are interested in the social spread of ideas and 
paradigms. The development of the common law, for example, is a 
distributed process. No individual jurist, academic, or lawyer is able to 
unilaterally impose his or her specific vision of what the law is or what the law 
ought to be. It is a process of prestige and persuasion—where prestige is a 
function of one’s structural position within a network, and persuasion is about 
one’s ability to use legal argumentation to convince his or her colleagues of 
the merit of their argument.123 We are interested in the origin, persistence, 
and ultimate success of various legal ideas, doctrines, and paradigms. In law, 
as in many other pursuits, there exists a marketplace for ideas where most 
ideas do not persist. However, some do. An important question is why do some 
persist and others fade?124 
With a reasonable understanding of the current and future structure in 
place, it is possible to study the flow and spread of ideas and paradigms using 
the tools of social epidemiology.125 Among other things, social epidemiology 
and social physics is the study of how various social structures impact the 
spread or persistence of various ideas.126 Like very contagious pathogens, 
 
 123. These themes are explored in some recent work in political science. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 
BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). 
 124. For an exploration of these questions, see Katz et al., supra note 50. 
 125. Obviously one must remain mindful of Laplace’s Demon as described infra Part III.B.2. 
 126. See generally ALEX PENTLAND, SOCIAL PHYSICS: HOW GOOD IDEAS SPREAD—THE LESSONS 
FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2014); Luís M.A. Bettencourt et al., The Power of a Good Idea: Quantitative 
Modeling of the Spread of Ideas from Epidemiological Models, 364 PHYSICA A 513 (2006). 
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transformative ideas tend to win out while poor ideas rarely catch fire.127 
However, there is a large intermediate class of ideas whose fate can be said to 
be contingent. If those without social authority do not embrace the idea, it 
will not persist (even if it is superior to its alternatives). For those classes of 
ideas, structure matters. Structure drives system behavior in a way yet to be 
fully appreciated by legal theorists.128 
 
Figure 5. Diffusion of Paradigms on the American Law Professoriate 
 
In order to offer a concrete implementation of these ideas, Figure 5 
offers a hypothetical diffusion simulation across the American law 
professoriate where the displayed structure maps the relationship between 
where an individual professor attended law school and the institution where 
that individual now teaches.129 Tracing across that structure is a hypothetical 
idea (pathogen) with some underlying level of infectiousness. High-
infectiousness ideas always spread and low-infectiousness ideas do not spread, 
but the intermediate class of ideas are far more likely to succeed if they 
emanate or are quickly adopted by institutions with high social standing. 
 
 127. See generally ANDREW CHESTERMAN, MEMES OF TRANSLATION: THE SPREAD OF IDEAS IN 
TRANSLATION THEORY (1997); Susan Blackmore, The Power of Memes, 283 SCI. AM. 64 (2000). For 
application in law, see generally Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331 
(2005); Simon Deakin, Evolution for our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, 55 CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 
1 (2003); Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS 
291 (1999); and Daniel Martin Katz et al., Legal N-Grams? A Simple Approach to Track the ‘Evolution’ 
of Legal Language, JURIX PROC. (2011). 
 128. There have been some case studies of this phenomenon documented by the “historical 
institutionalists.” They highlight various sociopolitical mechanisms responsible for the lock-in of 
historically questionable narratives. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING 
RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999); 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE 
SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial 
Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 343, 
374–75 (2007). However, none of this work offers a rigorous and generalizable model for the 
underlying phenomenon. 
 129. This structure is an empirically derived snapshot drawn from Katz et al., supra note 50. 
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Similar approaches attempting to marry empirical phenomena to 
theoretical models would significantly advance our understanding of the 
complex socio-political ecosystem driving the development of the law. These 
would include the social spread of various legal ideas across the judiciary, the 
diffusion of policies in a legislative and executive context, and further work 
on the impact of law school socialization on the long-term development of 
the law. 
2. Emergence, Feedback, Laplace’s Demon, and System Prediction 
With all we currently know and all we might know about the operation 
of any given system, it is all too tempting to overstate our ability to forecast its 
behavior. In his book, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, the renowned 
French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace fell victim to the trap of 
determinism, or what has been called by many “Laplace’s Demon.”130 Loosely 
speaking, Laplace argued that, if someone knew the precise location and 
momentum of every atom in the universe, their past and future values for any 
given time could be precisely calculated using the laws of classical 
mechanics.131 In a sense, Laplace was offering a strong case of modernist 
thinking. 
Of course, this specific line of thinking has been thoroughly discredited 
through the work of Heisenberg, Mandelbrot, Lorenz, and many others.132 As 
discussed earlier, what Lorenz demonstrated about weather is more broadly 
applicable to the behavior of other complex adaptive systems (including the 
law). In a real sense, complex systems is a discipline anchored to postmodern 
thinking. However, unlike much of the work done under the umbrella of 
postmodernism, it is actually rigorous. The discipline also has the benefit of 
actually building positive knowledge (as opposed to merely demonstrating 
what we do not know). Among other things, complex-systems scholars have 
 
 130. For a discussion of Laplace’s Demon, see generally Michael Shermer, Exorcising Laplace’s 
Demon: Chaos and Antichaos, History and Metahistory, 34 HIST. & THEORY 59 (1995); and Marcel 
Weber, Determinism, Realism, and Probability in Evolutionary Theory, 68 PHIL. SCI. 213 (2001). 
 131. See PIERRE-SIMON LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 4 (photo. reprt. 
2007) (F.W. Truscott & F.L. Emory trans., 1901). 
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior 
state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an 
intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated 
and the respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence 
sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same 
formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the 
lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would 
be present to its eyes. 
Id. 
 132. See generally LORENZ, supra note 122; BENOIT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, 
THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD (2006). 
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identified two major dynamics that frustrate our ability to predict system 
behavior: (1) feedback; and (2) emergence. 
i. Feedback 
There are two basic forms of feedback every system generates. Negative 
feedback systems tend toward stability over time as a change in the variable 
being considered brings about some sort of contrary response that moves that 
variable in the opposing direction.133 For example, heat applied to a cup of 
coffee is not stable because it will slowly cool through a process of negative 
feedback until it reaches equilibrium at room temperature. Standard models 
of social, economic, and political sciences tend to emphasize the equilibrium 
properties of a given phenomenon. As a first-order description of the relevant 
dynamics, such characterizations tend to perform fairly well. However, they 
are missing an important source of system behavior—positive feedback. 
In systems that display positive feedback, small changes get amplified 
because they run in the direction that the systems are already moving (or they 
are able to permanently push the system in that direction).134 Positive 
feedback systems are sensitive to initial conditions where small changes get 
amplified. Herds, bubbles, avalanches, cascades, and network effects are 
empirically observable phenomena whose theoretical origins are linked to 
various forms of positive feedback. The skewed distribution of social authority 
displayed earlier in Figure 4 is the byproduct of positive feedback. 
Understanding this dynamic informs future predictions of system 
behavior. On average, across all of its respective agents, the law is a system 
rapidly moving in the direction of social-authority inequality. Without a 
significant change in the underlying dynamics, law is a complex system that 
currently features (and will continue to feature) positive feedback and large 
amounts of social-authority inequality among cases,135 judges,136 law 
reviews,137 law schools,138 and other related social institutions. 
ii. Emergence 
Another important source of frustration is the tendency of complex 
systems to display emergent behavior. Complex adaptive systems produce 
emergent-scale behavior that is sometimes incapable of being understood 
 
 133. See Feedback Loops, STARTING POINT: TEACHING ENTRY LEVEL GEOSCIENCE, http://serc. 
carleton.edu/introgeo/models/loops.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Smith, supra note 107, at 325–34. See generally Post & Eisen, supra note 67. 
 136. See Katz & Stafford, supra note 86. 
 137. See Smith, supra note 107, at 355. 
 138. See Katz et al., supra note 50. 
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except through system-wide study.139 There is not complete agreement about 
the conditions giving rise to emergent phenomena. In general, however, 
systems display emergence when the micro-study of individual actors in a 
given system yields incomplete information about the entirety of the 
organization.140 Instead, interactions between the components help structure 
the outputs of the given system. These themes are well articulated in classic 
treatments such as Micromotives and Macrobehavior by Thomas Schelling,141 and 
Emergence: From Chaos to Order by John Holland.142 As Peter Corning describes, 
“[a]mong other things, complexity theory gave mathematical legitimacy to 
the idea that processes involving the interactions among many parts may be 
at once deterministic yet for various reasons unpredictable.”143 
There is a variety of examples of emergent behavior in social and physical 
systems, including ecosystems, where order emerges from the interspecies 
interactions, the phase transition of various chemicals, and the rise of fads 
and other cultural cascades. Some such systems seem mundane but are 
nonetheless emergent: 
 Automobile traffic is another example of a complex system. To 
characterize the global properties of a traffic system, one could code 
a set of individual-level variables, including the horsepower of the 
respective vehicles, the disposition of the drivers, and a host of 
decisional rules employed by the driver, including the leave space 
and a driver’s ideal speed and lane. Even with an understanding of 
all of these properties, it is ultimately the interactions between actors 
that structure outputs for the overall system. Whether flow or 
bottleneck will emerge is a function of the intermingling of 
individuals, each of whom possesses a host of these attributes and 
decisional rules. Thus, it depends upon the precise spatial 
distribution of agents and the nature of their local interactions.144 
 
 139. See, e.g., JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & ROBERT AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES: SOCIAL 
SCIENCE FROM THE BOTTOM UP 1–2 (1996). See generally STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE 
CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2002). 
 140. See Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but 
Promising When Combined, in ENGINEERING SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS: METHODOLOGIES AND 
APPLICATIONS 3 (Sven A. Brueckner et al. eds., 2005) (“A system exhibits emergence when there 
are coherent emergents at the macro-level that dynamically arise from the interactions between 
the parts at the micro-level. Such emergents are novel [with respect to] the individual parts of 
the system.”); see also David J. Chalmers, Strong and Weak Emergence, in THE RE-EMERGENCE OF 
EMERGENCE: THE EMERGENTIST HYPOTHESIS FROM SCIENCE TO RELIGION 245 (Philip Clayton & 
Paul Davies eds., 2006). 
 141. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). 
 142. See generally JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1998). 
 143. Peter A. Corning, The Re-Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory, 
7 COMPLEXITY 18, 21 (2002). 
 144. See Katz & Stafford, supra note 86, at 466 (footnote omitted). 
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Notwithstanding the difficult—and often emergent—flavor of traffic systems, 
there is actually a robust literature where scholars help provide insight 
regarding how to most robustly and safely manage traffic throughput.145 In 
other words, even though the underlying system is a complex adaptive system, 
it is still quite possible to engage in appropriately applying scientific methods 
to the question. 
As is the case with traffic systems, so too it is also the case for legal systems. 
The study of emergence in legal systems would help us better quantify the 
magnitude of the legal system’s irreducibility and incompressibility. This 
would, in part, provide a representation of how much we are unable to know 
and predict about the system through the construction of theoretical and 
empirical models that might include various structural and performance 
metrics. To borrow from the framework articulated by former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, our effort is in part focused upon converting the 
“unknown unknowns” into “known unknowns.”146 
IV. MONITORING LEGAL COMPLEXITY 
Applying the measurement metrics outlined in Part III to a legal system 
or subsystem would provide a snapshot of the system’s complexity. But 
important questions would remain: Compared to what? How much is too 
much? In which direction is the system moving? One way of enriching 
knowledge in this regard would be by repeating the measurements over time 
and over many subsystems to gain a deeper understanding of comparative 
complexity (e.g., tax versus environmental law) and complexity trends. But 
still, such exercises would provide a sense only of how the different metrics 
behave over time, not of how the system as a whole behaves over time. 
Monitoring legal system complexity thus should operate at two levels. On 
the surface, comparative and trend analyses like those just described, 
including of user features such as compliance burdens, provide real-time 
assessments of how complex a legal system is and whether relative complexity 
 
 145. See, e.g., G.A. Mendes et al., Traffic Gridlock on Complex Networks, 391 PHYSICA A 362 (2012); 
Kai Nagel et al., Still Flowing: Approaches to Traffic Flow and Traffic Jam Modeling, 51 OPERATIONS RES. 
681 (2003); Jason Sewall et al., Virtualized Traffic: Reconstructing Traffic Flows from Discrete Spatiotemporal 
Data, 17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VISUALIZATION & COMPUTER GRAPHICS 26 (2011). 
 146. The full quote is as follows: 
Reports that say there’s—that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to 
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things that we know 
that we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there 
are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones 
we don’t know we don’t know. 
Defense Department Briefing, at 37:40 (C-SPAN television broadcast Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.c-
span.org/video/?168646-1/defense-department-briefing. The quote is actually linked to the 
longstanding problem of induction and more recently has been popularized in research about 
so-called “black swan events.” See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT 
OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE FRAGILITY (2007). 
A5_RUHL&KATZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2015  8:54 AM 
232 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:191 
is increasing or decreasing.147 Extreme shifts in these metrics could raise red 
flags as to system performance. At a deeper level, however, monitoring 
changes in network interconnection and synchronization would allow more 
direct evaluation of system-wide behavior and a platform for testing system 
performance. This Part outlines a platform and methods for doing so. 
A. DESIGNING “LEGAL MAPS” FOR NETWORK BEHAVIOR MONITORING 
Measuring system content, structure, information, and computation is 
necessary to construct a network model of the system, but once that model is 
constructed, another set of metrics is necessary to assess what is happening 
inside the system. For example, a metric of network growth would measure 
how the network expands or contracts, and a metric of system intensity could 
measure the rate of information flow and orientation along different 
feedback and feedforward channels. To make such evaluations requires a 
platform representing the networked system in real time—what we call Legal 
Maps. 
Legal Maps is the legal system equivalent of more familiar applications 
for geographic navigation, such as Google Maps. The building block of 
Google Maps is Geographic Information Systems (“GIS”) technology, which 
is a computer system for capturing, storing, checking, and displaying data 
related to positions on Earth’s surface.148 By integrating many “layers” of data, 
such as rainfall, vegetation, roads, and so on, GIS can show many different 
kinds of data on one map, thus enabling people to more easily see, analyze, 
and understand patterns and relationships.149 Assembling GIS maps requires 
data capture, conversion, and digitization of data from many sources into 
compatible formats, metrics, and scales; integration of the multi-sourced data 
into one projection; and manipulation of the data structures to allow 
mapping, modeling, and other methods to extract information about 
patterns and relationships, such as the effect of rainfall levels on vegetation 
near roadways.150 
Google Maps combines a highly layered GIS map of geographic and 
other details with sophisticated algorithms, allowing the user to search the 
map for directions, distances, points of interest, and so on. In addition, 
Google Maps feeds data from smartphones and other sources into the map 
on a continuous basis to provide a dynamic, real-time user interface to 
 
 147. See, e.g., Rakhyun E. Kim, The Emergent Network Structure of the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreement System, 23 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 980 (2013) (tracing the network structure of the 
world’s multilateral environmental agreements from 1857 to 2012). 
 148. See GIS (Geographic Information System), NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http:// 
education.nationalgeographic.com/encyclopedia/geographic-information-system-gis (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2015). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See What Is GIS?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://webgis.wr.usgs.gov/globalgis/ 
tutorials/what_is_gis.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
A5_RUHL&KATZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2015  8:55 AM 
2015] LEGAL COMPLEXITY 233 
communicate useful information, such as traffic density. For example, if a 
highway is closed due to an accident, drivers can use Google Maps to identify 
where traffic is at its worst and alternate routes carrying less traffic.151 
Legal Maps would be built on the same kind of platform as Google Maps, 
starting with layers of data relevant to the legal system network. For example, 
the hierarchy network of the United States Code, as described above in Part 
III, would be represented as a discrete layer, as would the hierarchies of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, the federal courts, and the corollaries for states. 
Then the network’s architecture would be represented. Cross-references 
within each layer, such as between sections of the Tax Code (nodes), would 
be represented as connections (edges) representing directionality and 
strength (e.g., one provision references another provision three times). 
Citation network visualizations like this already exist for judicial opinions in 
search engines, such as Ravel Law.152 Then references between layers, such as 
a regulation referencing a statutory provision and a court referencing the 
regulation, would also be mapped. Additional layers relevant to the system 
behavior could be added—such as provisions of the Constitution, citations in 
attorney briefs, administrative rulings, and so on—and the interconnections 
within and between each layer could be mapped. Search algorithms can then 
be devised to identify patterns such as clusters of tightly connected statutory 
and regulatory provisions, particular courts’ and agencies’ decisions, and so 
on.153 
Legal Maps, like Google Maps, would also operate as a real-time (or 
nearly real-time) representation of the legal system’s dynamics. Events such 
as promulgation or repeal of a regulation or a new judicial opinion can be 
streamed into the map system with appropriate representations of cross-
references and citations, and the system’s information flow paths and rates 
could be observed (e.g., are certain regulations strong gatekeeper nodes 
between the statutory provisions they reference and judicial opinions 
referencing the regulation?). Streams from news and social media could also 
be fed into Legal Maps to observe how the legal system responds to rising 
social interest in a policy topic (e.g., how long before courts mention the 
trend and new regulations are promulgated around the trend?). Like Google 
Maps, layers could be selected or excluded to allow analysis of paired layers, 
and over time, a user’s search history could be tracked to provide tailored 
maps, such that a practitioner of tax or environmental law could work within 
the sector and layers of the system most relevant to his or her practice. The 
 
 151. See Google Maps, GOOGLE+ (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:31 AM), https://plus.google.com/+Google 
Maps/posts/UpBRC7BhXWj. 
 152. RAVEL L., https://www.ravellaw.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 153. See generally Carlo Garbarino, A Model of Legal Systems as Evolutionary Networks: Normative 
Complexity and Self-Organization of Clusters of Rules (Bocconi Univ., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
1601338, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1601338 (describing legal 
systems as clustered networks of rules). 
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end result would be as close a representation of a map of the legal-system 
network as one could attain using current technology. 
Indeed, what we describe can be achieved today. All of the data described 
are already available in digital form. Capturing them and converting them 
into compatible digital representations would be no more complicated that 
what Google Maps accomplishes for geographic data. Indeed, Koniaris et al. 
recently constructed a partial representation of such a model for European 
Union (“E.U.”) legislation, plotting over 250,000 legal documents (nodes) 
spanning 60 years of E.U. legislation.154 Their model linked three layers—
treaties, statutes, and judicial opinions—yielding almost one million 
connections (edges) within the network. Using this network representation, 
they performed a temporal analysis of the evolution of the legislation 
network, as well as a robust resilience test to assess its vulnerability under 
specific cases that may lead to possible breakdowns. Similarly, the search 
algorithms we anticipate Legal Maps using are no more sophisticated than 
those used in Google Maps. The only constraints to further development of 
such models for the legal system are time and money. But, even assuming the 
time and money were available, why build Legal Maps? 
B. TESTING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
Google Maps has obvious valuable uses, not the least of which is 
providing directions between two points. Of even greater value when out on 
the road are the traffic density and trip rerouting functions. And Google now 
provides an application program interface—a set of routines, protocols, and 
tools for building software applications—allowing other application builders 
to integrate Google Maps into their user interfaces.155 Legal Maps could 
provide all of these functions as well, several of which would greatly enhance 
the capacity for monitoring legal system complexity and behavior. We provide 
a few examples below. 
1. Synchronization Monitoring 
The feedback mechanisms characteristic of a complex adaptive system 
are the source of both system resilience and systemic risk. The term “systemic 
risk” has become closely associated with the financial system collapse of 
2008,156 but the concept of systemic risk is not limited to financial systems—
 
 154. See M. Koniaris et al., Network Analysis in the Legal Domain: A Complex Model for European 
Union Legal Sources, ARXIV (Jan 21, 2015), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1501.05237.pdf. 
 155. Google Maps APIs, GOOGLE DEVELOPERS, https://developers.google.com/maps (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 156. The concept of systemic risk has gained prominence in legal scholarship primarily in 
connection with regulation of financial systems, for which it is widely asserted that “regulation has 
an important role to play in managing systemic risk.” Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1352 
(2011). This concern has been building since the 1980s. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Regulatory 
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it applies to all complex systems. Dirk Helbing of the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology defines systemic risk as 
the risk of having not just statistically independent failures, but 
interdependent, so-called “cascading” failures in a network of N 
interconnected system components. That is, systemic risks result 
from connections between risks (“networked risks”). In such cases, 
a localized initial failure (“perturbation”) could have disastrous 
effects and cause, in principle, unbounded damage as N goes to 
infinity. . . . Even higher risks are implied by networks of networks, 
that is, by the coupling of different kinds of systems. In fact, new 
vulnerabilities result from the increasing interdependencies 
between our energy, food and water systems, global supply chains, 
communication and financial systems, ecosystems and climate.157 
As Helbing notes, the World Economic Forum has described this global 
environment as a “hyper-connected” world exposed to massive systemic 
risks.158 Helbing identifies the drivers of systemic instability (such as tipping 
points, positive feedback, and complexity) and explains how they affect 
various global systems (such as finance, communications, and social 
conflict).159 The upshot is that catastrophic damage scenarios are increasingly 
realistic, and that “[s]ome of the worst disasters have happened because of a 
failure to imagine that they were possible.”160 Yet our political and economic 
systems simply are not wired with the incentives needed to imagine and guard 
against these outlier events. 
Quite simply, we need to build systemic risk into our scenarios of the 
future, including for the legal system. Helbing suggests the development of a 
“Global Systems Science” discipline devoted to studying the interactions and 
interdependencies in the global techno-socio-economic-environmental 
system leading to systemic risk.161 It would be pointless to exclude the legal 
system from Helbing’s proposal, and it would be naïve to think that the legal 
system is exempt from the systemic risk problem. Hence the legal system must 
 
Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Regulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 560–61 
(1989) (“[T]he goal of bank regulation, to prevent losses to the banking system as a result of bank 
failure, makes the regulatory system overinvested in particular banks whose failure poses systemic 
risks.”); Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
303, 308 (“What we should be concerned about is systemic risk—the risk arising from the systems 
of the international market as such—not the risk which relates to the individual investor or even 
an individual institution. Given the size of today’s predominant financial players, the failure of one 
could affect the whole market.”). 
 157. Dirk Helbing, Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond, 497 NATURE 51, 51 (2013) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 158. Id. (citing Hyperconnected World, WORLD ECON. F., http://www.weforum.org/projects/ 
hyperconnected-world (last visited Sept. 15, 2015)). 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 57. 
 161. See id. at 51, 57–58. 
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(1) anticipate systemic failures in the systems it is designed to regulate, but 
also (2) anticipate systemic risk in the legal system as well. 
Legal Maps could provide a platform for the second type of monitoring. 
Complexity scientists have identified a strong marker for systemic risk in the 
form of highly synchronized positive-feedback systems that give rise to the 
“networked risks” to which Helbing refers. When all feedback in the system 
has harmonized in the same self-reinforcing direction, a small, seemingly 
noncausal disruption to the system can lead to massive failure.162 As econo-
physicist Didier Sornette puts it: “[t]he collapse is fundamentally due to the 
unstable position; the instantaneous cause of the collapse is secondary.”163 His 
assessment of the financial crash, for example, is that, like other financial 
bubbles, over time “the expectation of future earnings rather than present 
economic reality . . . motivate[d] the average investor.”164 What pops the 
bubble might seem like an inconsequential event in isolation, but it is enough 
to set the collapse in motion. “Essentially, anything would work once the 
system is ripe.”165 
By tracking information flow and structure in the legal system over time, 
including the conduits across which it moves and their direction, strength, 
and timing, Legal Maps could help monitor for the buildup of highly 
synchronized information pathways that could open the door to cascade 
failures.166 For example, if financial, environmental, and other regulators 
receive information along a tightly synchronized set of pathways and then 
move in the same direction based on information input (e.g., increase 
monitoring if information indicates a certain trend), interruption in the 
information flow or a surge in unreliable information can set the legal system 
up for a cascade of failures. Analyses of both the financial collapse of 2008 
and the BP Deep Horizon oil spill suggest such forces were at play in the 
relevant regulatory systems and contributed to the cascade of failures within 
and outside the legal system.167 
 
 162. See generally Xiyun Zhang et al., Explosive Synchronization in a General Complex Network, 88 
PHYSICAL REV. E 010802(R) (2013). 
 163. Didier Sornette, Dragon-Kings, Black Swans and the Prediction of Crises, 2 INT’L J. 
TERRASPACE SCI. & ENGINEERING 1, 13 (2009). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. The study of change in time of network structure is a focal point of network science. See, 
e.g., Petter Holme & Jari Saramäki, Temporal Networks, 519 PHYSICS REP. 97 (2012). Koniaris et al. 
traced the evolution of the European Union’s “Legislation Network” over a 60-year period. 
Koniaris et al., supra note 154, at 12–13. 
 167. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xviii (2011) 
(assessing causes of the financial crisis and concluding that “widespread failures in financial 
regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets”); 
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: 
THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 122 (2011) (assessing causes 
of the oil spill including failures in regulation). Groups of legal scholars from the Center for 
Progressive Reform have also published two studies of the blowout reaching similar conclusions. 
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2. Stress Tests 
Financial system models allow introduction of perturbations to assess 
what happens when the system is put under stress.168 Similar stress testing 
could be applied in legal system models. For example, the rate of information 
flow (e.g., rate of variation in financial instruments or number of pollution 
violations) could be manipulated in the network Legal Maps model to see 
how the legal system handles high-flow rates and where flow jams occur under 
different stress conditions. Or, as Koniaris et al. performed on their E.U. 
legislation network model, pieces of network structure could be deleted (as 
in a proposed major deregulatory event) or added (as in a proposed 
enactment of a major new regulatory regime) to test how network structure 
and behavior would respond in terms of reconfigured synchronization 
patterns and information flow jams.169 While there are always unforeseen 
circumstances (i.e., unknown unknowns) which any legal system must 
confront on a constantly evolving landscape, it is still possible to stress test a 
legal system model against a range of known or proposed scenarios in the 
effort to determine its robustness. 
3. Interdependent Systems Analysis 
Transportation disaster planning and assessment is turning to 
interdependent systems analysis (“ISA”) to move beyond single-disaster 
assessment (which usually focuses on identifying human error) to understand 
why disasters happen in general.170 ISA uses network analytics and stress 
testing to link the system under study to its co-evolving systems over relevant 
time scales. ISA improves the ability of planners to identify the endogenous 
and exogenous conditions leading to systemic risk and, ultimately, to failure 
cascades.171 The legal system, in coevolution with the social systems it is 
intended to regulate and protect, is a perfect medium for ISA. From the 
 
See generally ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE BP CATASTROPHE: 
WHEN HOBBLED LAW AND HOLLOW REGULATION LEAVE AMERICANS UNPROTECTED (2011); 
ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATORY BLOWOUT: HOW 
REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP DISASTER POSSIBLE, AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE FIXED TO 
AVOID A RECURRENCE (2010). For a broad and thoughtful examination of regulatory failure, 
including whether it is in fact as responsible for the financial crisis, the oil spill, and other social 
and economic calamities as is often claimed retrospectively, see generally REGULATORY 
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012). 
 168. See Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 2236, 2238–39 (2014). 
 169. See Koniaris et al., supra note 154, at 10–11. 
 170. See Lloyd Burton & M. Jude Egan, Courting Disaster: Systemic Failures and Reactive Responses 
in Railway Safety Regulation, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 558–61 (2011). 
 171. Cf. Chris Barrett et al., Human Initiated Cascading Failures in Societal Infrastructures, 7 PLoS 
ONE e45406, at 1–2 (2012) (discussing human-initiated “co-evolving cascades in interdependent 
infrastructures” such as failures in wireless communication networks and transportation networks 
during an evacuation). 
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sectors law regulates and protects, Legal Maps could be built out to include 
data feeds such as financial, manufacturing, environmental, and 
demographic data. When one system experiences failure, such as a financial 
crash, retrospective analysis of how the legal system responded prior to, 
during, and after the event can help identify where stress and failure were 
rising or falling in the legal system, such as by excessive synchronization or 
information flow jams. 
C. COMPARATIVE DESIGN STUDIES 
In a world where all of the above could be accomplished, it would then 
be useful to conduct cross-system comparisons, such as between common law 
and civil code systems, or across different bodies of law (e.g., tax versus 
environmental) and national law systems (e.g., U.S. versus China). 
Particularly as economic and social phenomena occur increasingly at global 
scales, nations’ legal systems are increasingly interdependent, thus supporting 
the case for building out and linking Legal Maps for all nations. 
V. MANAGING LEGAL COMPLEXITY 
A. DEFINING TOO MUCH COMPLEXITY 
Going back to the Tax Code example, most assertions regarding its 
excessive complexity focus on its impact on the taxpayer—it is too hard to 
comprehend, takes too much time, costs too much, and so on. These are, of 
course, valid concerns, and at some point, extreme conditions in these 
respects for a legal system could indicate that something has gone wrong and 
needs adjusting. But assuming a legal system is fulfilling the purposes it was 
designed to accomplish (e.g., in the case of the Tax Code, raising necessary 
revenue in an equitable and efficient manner), the compliance burdens it 
imposes may simply be an inevitable consequence of some minimum 
necessary complexity of the system. 
Of greater concern, therefore, would be the possibility that complexity 
at some level could undermine the system’s capacity to achieve its purposes. 
Indeed, as suggested above in connection with the feedback synchronization 
problem, one of the focal points of complexity science research is how system 
complexity contributes to both the system’s robustness and its fragility. As 
complexity scientists David Alderson and John Doyle explain, the adaptive 
quality of complex adaptive systems contributes to overall system robustness 
in several senses: 
Reliability involves robustness to component failures. Efficiency is 
robustness to resource scarcity. Scalability is robustness to changes to 
the size and complexity of the system as a whole. Modularity is 
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robustness to structured component rearrangements. Evolvability is 
robustness of lineages to changes on long time scales.172 
At its core, therefore, “robustness is a measure of feature persistence in 
systems where the perturbations . . . represent changes in system 
composition, system topology, or in the fundamental assumptions regarding 
the environment in which the system operates.”173 Robustness can be thought 
of as the fitness of the system’s options in two respects—resistance to forces 
of change, and resilience to those effects not successfully repelled.174 
Robustness is built from the system’s organized complexity—the networked 
content and structure that allows information to flow and be processed 
through the system.175 But even in robust legal systems that satisfy normative 
preferences, that network structure also exposes the system to fragility, as 
perturbations can cascade down the system’s feedback and feedforward 
chains—i.e., the kind of systemic system meltdown discussed above.176 
The response to such events in many human-controlled systems usually 
is to build more organized network structure into the system—to beef it up 
with new legal content and structure—which ironically also adds more risk of 
fragility.177 This “robust yet fragile” dilemma has been identified in many 
contexts as the source of systemic risk.178 The financial system crisis of 2008, 
for example, has been attributed to an overload of systemic risk, including 
risk generated by the growing complexity of the financial regulatory system 
itself as it worked to keep up with the regulated industry’s innovations.179 A 
post-spill task force reached a similar conclusion regarding regulatory agency 
oversight of drilling in the Gulf of Mexico prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill. The report concluded that the regulatory complexity, built up by 
rounds of agency responses to prior spills and environmental injuries, had 
outstripped agency capacity.180 A major thrust of legal-complexity monitoring 
and an advantage of having built out Legal Maps, thus, would be to improve 
 
 172. David L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications 
For Network-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN & CYBERNETICS 839, 
840 (2010). For a comprehensive review of their model and its application to systemic risk in the 
legal system, see generally Ruhl, supra note 37. 
 173. Erica Jen, Stable or Robust? What’s the Difference?, 8 COMPLEXITY 12, 13–14 (2003) 
(comparing stability and robustness). 
 174. Id. at 16–17. 
 175. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 172, at 840–41. 
 176. See Ruhl, supra note 37, at 588 (describing failure cascades). 
 177. See Alderson & Doyle, supra note 172, at 841–42. 
 178. See id. at 839, 842–43. 
 179. Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks 
and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 863–64 (2012) 
 180. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra 
note 167, at 78 (concluding the agency lacked “a formal, bureau-wide compilation of rules, 
regulations, policies, or practices” and had “no formal process to promote standardization, 
consistency, and operational efficiency” across its many district offices). 
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the capacity to monitor for sectors in the system experiencing creep towards 
greater complexity of structure, in particular the synchronization of 
networked positive feedback mechanisms. 
B. MANAGING TOO MUCH COMPLEXITY 
So, how complex should the legal system be to get its job done without 
undue risk of systemic failure? Our short answer is: we don’t know. We don’t 
even know how complex the legal system is, much less how complex it should 
be. But that, of course, is the point of this Article—to initiate a research 
agenda that will inform both of those questions. Some work has been done 
but much more remains ahead. 
That said, we can offer impressions of how improved empirical 
understanding of legal complexity can inform its management. We say 
management rather than reduction because, as explained above, there is no a 
priori basis for asserting that all legal complexity is structurally or normatively 
bad. Therefore, this agenda is something of a management problem—i.e., 
how to get the most “good” out of the legal system while minimizing the “bad.” 
Any hope of doing so with even limited success will depend on developing 
and implementing the measurement metrics and monitoring methods 
outlined in Parts III and IV. From there, we anticipate two technology 
applications for approaching the management problem: (1) machine 
learning; and (2) user interface design. 
1. Real-Time Monitoring Leveraging Learning Algorithms 
Monitoring for system complexity, focused around the detection and 
prevention of cascade failures, will require that Legal Maps embed sensors to 
alert policy makers to the markers of impending system failure from internal 
complexity and external disturbances.181 Research on power grid networks 
has shown, for example, that disabling even a small number of network failure 
sensors can render the grid subject to new types of disturbances even when 
they remain robust to conventional disturbances.182 
The legal system already incorporates numerous instrumental sensors 
such as pre-decisional impact assessments and monitoring, reporting, and 
disclosure requirements, all of which fall under the theoretical domain of 
what is known as “reflexive law.”183 The National Environmental Policy Act, 
 
 181. Alderson & Doyle, supra note 172, at 841–42. 
 182. See Yang Yang et al., Network Observability Transitions, 109 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS, 
258701, 258701-4 (2012). 
 183. See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 
25 J. CORP. L. 41, 48–51 (1999) (explaining the theory and development of reflexive law); see 
also Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995) (developing and 
applying theory of reflexive law in environmental field); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 127–51 (2001) (defining reflexive law and 
reviewing its instruments). 
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which requires federal agencies to assess the environmental impact or their 
proposed actions, is an example of a legal system sensor protocol for pre-
decisional impact assessment.184 Similar pre-decision assessment measures 
apply in agency rulemaking as well. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act requires agencies to prepare an analysis for any rule that may have an 
important economic impact on a significant number of small businesses, and 
similar pre-decision review measures abound in administrative law.185 Of 
course, whether these kinds of sensors work, and whether they are efficient 
even if they do work, are important (and currently unanswered) questions. 
The point made here is that our legal system has implanted many system 
sensors to evaluate itself internally, to detect changes in its environment, and 
to measure its interactions with other social systems. 
Similarly, sensors can be embedded in Legal Maps to leverage learning 
algorithms that detect conditions found over time to be associated with 
cascade failure and other undesirable properties. This type of learning 
algorithm is called “machine learning.” Machine learning is “the systematic 
study of algorithms and systems that improve their knowledge or performance 
with experience.”186 It is the technology behind your e-mail spam filter as well 
as, in a legal application, the electronic discovery process.187 The program 
“learns” through algorithm-based heuristics designed to detect patterns in 
data as well as through interaction with the user.188 For example, as an e-mail 
user repeatedly sends emails with “Earn Cash Fast” as the subject lines to the 
spam folder, the program begins to associate that subject text and other 
attributes associated with the e-mails—such as the origin of such e-mails and 
other text they contain—with junk status. Soon, that class of e-mails goes 
straight to the junk mail box even if the subject line text changes. At first the 
 
 184. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). This provision also requires assessment of alternative 
actions, short- and long-term implications, and “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments 
of resources.” Id. § 4332(2)(C)(iii)–(v). 
 185. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012). The law was amended by the Small Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 611. For thorough descriptions of this and related 
pre-promulgation review requirements, see Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement 
Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 89 (2000); Daniel Cohen, S. 981, The Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998: The Most Recent 
Attempt to Develop a Solution in Search of a Problem, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 699 (1998). 
 186. PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE 
SENSE OF DATA 3 (2012). For a sweeping overview of the current and potential use of machine 
learning in legal settings, see Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 
(2014). For an enjoyable survey of machine learning’s increasing application in a variety of 
settings, see LUKE DORMEHL, THE FORMULA: HOW ALGORITHMS SOLVE ALL OUR PROBLEMS . . . 
AND CREATE MORE (2014). 
 187. See Surden, supra note 186, at 90–91 (spam); id. at 112–13 (e-discovery). 
 188. See id. at 91–95. 
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process may make mistakes, but over time, the user and the algorithms train 
the program towards increasing accuracy.189 
Legal Maps could use the same machine-learning technology in the form 
of embedded algorithms to identify red-flag conditions of excessive legal 
complexity, such as synchronization and information-flow surges and 
blockages, the same way Google Maps shows the impacts of an interstate being 
shut down on surrounding roadway traffic. Had Legal Maps existed at the 
time of the financial collapse, for example, users could have rerun the 
historical record following the failure to identify the conditions within and 
outside the legal system that were experienced in the run-up to the failure.190 
This would allow Legal Maps to learn those conditions and alert the users 
when those conditions are detected once again, but this time in advance of 
an actual collapse. This sensor alert would allow regulators to intervene with 
measures designed to preempt the failure, and whether those measures are 
successful or not, Legal Maps could be trained with that information so that 
it could assist in designing interventions when sensors call the alert again. This 
technology could also be used to experiment with stress-test scenarios that 
users of Legal Maps could run to simulate a variety of disturbances, such as a 
surge in social-media trending, the repeal or promulgation of a major 
regulatory statute, or flurries of licensing, registrations, or other regulatory 
approval applications. Over time, regulators could begin to learn from Legal 
Maps’ learning, the way Google Maps learns about driver responses to traffic 
situations, gaining important perspectives about when and where legal system 
complexity appears to be approaching conditions of high systemic risk, as well 
as lessons about legal institution and instrument design that can reduce such 
stress.191 For example, the prescriptive legal complexity theory assertion that 
decentralized regulatory systems are more resilient than centralized top-down 
structures could be tested by comparing the performance of different regime 
structures over time. Of course, because the legal system itself is dynamic and 
adaptive, no lessons could be thought of as permanent—the Legal Maps 
training process would run indefinitely and human intervention and 
oversight would remain important. 
2. Designing Legal User Interfaces 
Legal complexity is a challenge to the participants in many legal systems. 
Indeed, as noted above, most of the claims regarding excessive Tax Code 
complexity point to impacts on taxpayers, with cost and time as the alleged 
 
 189. Spam filters must be consistently tuned and updated as the techniques used by 
spammers evolve over time. 
 190. Of course, to the extent that a future failure is drawn from the set of “unknown, 
unknowns,” then Legal Maps or any models or tools would be of limited effectiveness. 
 191. For an example drawn from the banking sector, see Paul Lippe, Daniel Martin Katz & 
Dan Jackson, Legal by Design: A New Paradigm for Handling Complexity in Banking Regulation and 
Elsewhere in Law, 93 OR. L. REV. 833 (2015). 
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proof. While there are occasional efforts toward simplifying the law, one 
alternative is to build intermediary systems that translate and compile “raw 
law” into clearer forms. The “law as code” or computational law movement is 
one which is in part interested in reducing complexity by developing various 
forms of “legal user interfaces.”192 Much like web browsers such as Firefox or 
Internet Explorer shield end users from the raw code, such systems could 
attempt to generalize what TurboTax has done for the Tax Code. Emerging 
legal technology companies such as Neota Logic are devoted to building such 
“expert systems” user interfaces for legal compliance problems.193 
Improving user interfaces can be a second-best alternative to reducing 
the complexity of the law itself when either reducing complexity is not 
desirable or no means of reducing legal complexity is apparent. As described 
above, complexity builds resilience in complex adaptive systems—law being 
no exception—hence some level of complexity is desirable. However, while 
the optimal level of legal complexity can be determined once appropriate 
metrics are identified and studied, it is not clear from any theory of 
complexity science how to fine tune so that just the right amount of 
complexity can be added or removed. Given how intertwined systems are, it 
could be difficult (even with Legal Maps up and running) to remove only 
some of the cross-references in the Tax Code, or between the Tax Code and 
other fields, and know how much complexity had been removed and what the 
effects would be on the still highly cross-referenced components. Rather, it 
may be an in-for-a-penny-in-for-a-pound proposition, suggesting that a 
complete rebuild from scratch would be needed instead, which presents its 
own set of political and design challenges. Until more is known about legal 
system complexity through initiatives like Legal Maps and measures to seed 
the system with machine learning sensors, work should continue on 
simplifying user interfaces for navigating legal systems without having to 
navigate their complexity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Much of the foregoing would have seemed like sheer fantasy as recently 
as just a few years ago. But that was before massive advances in data storage 
and computational capacity and their use to promote robust complexity and 
network sciences. These advances challenge traditionalists’ claims that the 
legal system is so exceptional or impenetrable that it cannot, in some 
substantial degree, be measured and modeled through computational 
methods applied in other disciplines. The legal system, a phrase used 
 
 192. Computational law is “[t]he study of formal representations and automated reasoning with 
laws (governmental regulations, business rules, and contracts) in electronically-mediated domains.” 
STANFORD COMPUTATIONAL LAW, http://complaw.stanford.edu (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 193. See NEOTA LOGIC, http://www.neotalogic.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
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ubiquitously in legal scholarship,194 is just that—a system. As such, its 
description and assessment are open to the empirical approaches we have 
suggested. This goes well beyond mere extrapolation from the empirical 
techniques already in play, such as citation databases and judicial voting 
studies. This is about building computational models of the legal system, its 
complexity, and its systemic risks. 
Early attempts to develop legal complexity metrics, build out a system 
model through Legal Maps, conduct stress tests, locate systemic risk, seed the 
system with machine learning sensors, and propose new legal designs will be 
rudimentary, coarse, and often wrong, and will be criticized for that. But 
succumbing to such critiques would have kept economists using the abacus 
and ecologists counting tree rings. It is time for lawyers to move beyond case 
studies, rhetoric, and conventional statistical methods—it is time to study the 
deep structure of legal complexity through the empirical and technological 
methods of complexity science. 
 
 
 194. Searching for the term “legal system” in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Journals database 
yields almost 10,000 articles using the term in some way. See supra note 42. 
